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CONVENTION
on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
done at Lugano on 16 September 1988
(90/C 189/07)
REPORT
by Mr P. JENARD
Honorary Director of Administration at the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Mr. G. MOLLER
President of the Court of First Instance in Toijala
In addition to the draft Convention and the other instruments drawn up by the government
experts, the draft explanatory report was submitted to the Governments of the Member
States of the European Communities and of the European Free Trade Association before the
Diplomatic Conference held in Lugano from 12 to 16 September 1988.
This report takes account of the comments made by certain Governments and of the amend-
ments made by the Diplomatic Conference to the drafts before it. It takes the form of a com-
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CHAPTER I
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
I. The Lugano Convention, opened for signature on
16 September 1988, is concluded between the
Member States of the European Communities and
the Member States of the European Free Trade
Association (EFT A).
It will be referred to in this report as the ' Lugano
Convention' although during the preparatory pro-
ceedings it was known as the 'Parallel Convention
It was given that name because it corresponds very
closely to the Brussels Convention of 27 September
1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters, which was
concluded between the six original Community
Member States (1) and adopted consequent upon
the accession of new Member States to the Com-
munities (2). For convenience, that Convention, in
its adopted form, will be referred to as the ' Brussels
Convention
Although the Lugano Convention takes not only
its structure but also numerous provisions from the
Brussels Convention, it is nevertheless a separate
instrument.
2. This report does not contain a detailed commen-
tary on all the provisions of the Lugano Conven-
tion.
Where provisions are identical to those of the Brus-
sels Convention, the reader should refer to the
existing reports by Mr P. Jenard on the 1968 Con-
vention, by Mr P. Schlosser on the 1978 Conven-
tion on the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the
United Kingdom and by Messrs Evrigenis and
Kerameus on the 1982 Convention on the acces-
sion of Greece (3).
The provisions in force in each of the EFT A Mem-
ber States on the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments and an account of the relevant
conventions concluded by those States with one
another or with Member States of the Communities
are not included in the body of this report but are
given in Annexes I and II. This different layout
from previous reports has been adopted so as not
to complicate the text.
2. JUSTIFICATION FOR AND BACKGROUND TO
THE LUGANO CONVENTION
3. The European Communities and EFTA are at pres-
ent made up of a great many European countries
who share very similar conceptions of constitu-
tional (separation of powers between the legisla-
ture, the executive and the judiciary), legal (pri-
macy of the rule of law and the rights of the
individual) and economic matters (market econ-
omy).
The two organizations differ however with regard
to their objectives and institutions. That is why we
felt it useful to give a brief outline.
A. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
4. The European Communities differ substantially
from the other international or European organiza-
tions on account of their particular aims and the
originality of their institutional machinery.
They pursue the specific objectives assigned to
them by the three Treaties establishing them
(ECSC EEC and Euratom) but their ultimate
objective is to establish a real European union.
The economic dimension of this union in the mak-
ing is complemented by a political discussion
which is expressed through the medium of Euro-
pean Political Cooperation, by means of which the
Twelve endeavour to harmonize their foreign poli-
CIes.
The construction of Europe initiated by the six
founding States (Belgium, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Italy, the Grand Duchy of Lux-
embourg and the Netherlands) took a step forward
with the signing first of all of the Treaty of Paris
(18 April 1951) which established the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and subse-
quently (on 25 March 1957) of the two Treaties of
Rome which laid the foundations of the European
Economic Community (EEC) and the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).
Denmark Ireland and the United Kingdom
acceded to those three Treaties on I January 1973
(the Nine), Greece on I January 1981 (the Ten),
Spain and Portugal on I January 1986 (the
Twelve).
The European Communities therefore currently
comprise twelve European countries which are
bound together by jointly undertaken commit-
ments.
5. With the Single European Act, which entered into
force on I July 1987, a new stage was reached on
the path towards a European union. This new
Community legal instrument aims in particular at
the progressive establishment, over a period expir-No. C 189/62 Official Journal of the European Communities 28. 7. 90
ing on 31 December 1992, of a real internal market
providing for the free movement of goods, persons
services and capital. It also aims at promoting sig-
. nificant progress in both the monetary field and
new policy sectors (in particular the environment
and new technologies). It makes Community deci-
sion-making machinery more flexible in a number
of fields and, by means of treaty provisions, institu-
tionalizes European Political Cooperation.
6. The institutional architecture of the Communities
rests on four pillars:
1. The Council of Ministers
The Council consists of the representatives of the
Member States and each Government delegates
one of its members to it, depending on the field of
competence and the nature of the subjects under
discussion.
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs coordinate gen-
eral Community policy.
The Council of Ministers is the Communities' deci-
sion-making body. It participates in legislative
power and as such is empowered to take binding
measures in the form of Regulations or Directives
which are directly binding on the Member States
and/ or their nationals. The Regulations are directly
applicable in the Member States, whereas Direc-
tives have to be incorporated into national legisla-
tion.
The Council' s decisions are prepared by the Perma-
nent Representatives Committee (Coreper), com-
posed of the Permanent Representatives of the
Member States to the European Communities.
The Council's decisions are taken unanimously, by
simple majority or by  qualified majority,
depending on the legal provisions on which they
are based.
The Single Act aims at multiplying the cases in
which a majority vote becomes standard practice
so as to expedite the proceedings of an enlarged
Community.
Twice a year the European Council brings together
the Heads of State or of Government of the Mem-
ber States. This body, set up at the highest level on
a political basis in 1975, was given Treaty recogni-
tion following the adoption of the Single Act.
Its main task is to work out guidelines and give the
necessary impetus to the developmept of the Com-
munity process.
2. The Commission
The Commission currently consists of 17 members
chosen by common agreement by the Govern-
ments.
The Commission is the most original institution in
the Community s institutional machinery. It cannot
be likened to a secretariat because the authors of
the Treaties chose to make it the prime mover of
European integration. It participates actively in the
preparation and formulation of the acts of the
Council by virtue of its power of initiative.
3.  The Court of Justice
The role of the Court of Justice is to ensure that
Community law is obeyed in the implementation
of the three Treaties establishing the European
Communities. Its powers are manifold and it has
inter alia  the power to give rulings in the form of
judgments on the validity of the acts of Com-
munity authorities and on the interpretation of the
Treaties and Community acts.
In its decisions, the Court has affirmed the preced-
ence of Community law over Member States' con-
stitutional and legislative provisions.
Under the Luxembourg Protocol of 3 June 1971
the Member States of the Communities conferred
jurisdiction upon the Court of Justice for giving
judgment on the interpretation of the 1968 Brussels
Convention, which is of particular concern to us.
4. The European Parliament
Since 1979 the Members of the European Parlia-
ment have been elected by direct universal suffrage
for a five-year term of office.
Although the European Parliament has quite exten-
sive powers of political supervision in respect of
the action of the Council and the Commission and
in the budgetary field, it does not however have
legislative powers similar to those of national Par-
liaments.
The Single Act contains new cooperation arrange-
ments designed to involve the Parliament more
closely in the exercise of the legislative power con-
ferred jointly upon the Council and the Commis-
SIOn.
7. In conclusion, in the field under review, it should
be noted that:
the Lugano. Convention is linked to the 1968
Brussels Convention which is based on Article
220 of the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community;
with regard to Community acts, legislative
power is mainly conferred upon the Council;28. 7. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 189/63
3. the European Communities have created a
very dense network of relations with the out-
side world which are embodied in agreements
of various kinds, either with States or with
organizations.
B. EFTA
8. The European Free Trade Association is a group of
six European countries which share with the Euro-
pean Communities the aim of creating a dynamic
homogeneous European economic area embracing
the Member States of the EEC and EFT A. That
aim was laid down in the Luxembourg Declaration
adopted on 9 April 1984 by the Ministers of all
EEC and EFT A Member States.
EFT A's goal is the removal of import duties, quo-
tas and other obstacles to trade in Western Europe
and the upholding of liberal, non-discriminatory
practices in international trade. Set up in 1960, the
Association now has six member countries: Aus-
tria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Switz-
erland.
EFT A's establishment and evolution form part of
the story of economic integration in Western
Europe. Its founder members, which included
Denmark, Portugal and the United Kingdom
adopted as their  first objective  the introduction of
free trade between themselves in industrial goods.
This objective was realized three years ahead of
schedule at the end of 1966.
9. The trade between the EFT A countries accounts
for only 13 to 14 % of their overall trade. Much
more important is their trade with the EEC which
is the source of more than half of their imports and
the destination of more than half of their exports.
The EFT A countries are also important trading
partners for the EEC, providing markets for
between a fifth and a quarter of EEC exports
(excluding trade between the EEC countries).
The closeness of the commercial links between the
EFT A and the EEC countries was one of the rea-
sons for the attempt in the 1950s to negotiate a free
trade area embracing the original six-nation EEC
and the other Western European countries. The
attempt failed. But when seven of these countries
resolved to strengthen their own links by founding
EFT A they saw the Association as, among other
things, a means of preparing the way for the even-
tual fulfilment of their hopes of a single European
market. Thus EFT A was born with the ambition of
bringing about a larger market including all the
countries of Western Europe. This was the  second
objective  of EFT A's founder members.
This second goal was in effect achieved in the
1970s through negotiations which brought each of
the present EFT A countries into a new relationship
with the EEC, and at the same time the EEC was
enlarged by the entry of two former EFTA coun-
tries, Denmark and the United Kingdom, and of
Ireland. Free trade agreements came into force
between the enlarged EEC and Austria, Portugal
Sweden and Switzerland on 1 January 1973, and
the EEC and Iceland on 1 April 1973. Similar
agreements came into force between Norway and
the EEC on 1 July 1973 and between Finland and
the EEC on 1 January 1974. Under these agree-
ments the import duties on almost all industrial
products were abolished from July 1977. These free
trade agreements also apply to trade between the
EFT A countries and three countries which joined
the EEC at later dates: Greece from 1 January
1981, Portugal and Spain from 1 January 1986.
As mentioned above, the extension and intensifica-
tion of EEC-EFTA cooperation have given rise
since 1984 to talks between the two groups of
States in many areas connected, directly or indi-
rectly, with the EEC's ambitious programme for the
creation of a genuine internal market in 1992. They
concern matters such as technical barriers to trade
competition rules intellectual property rights
product liability, etc.
The negotiations for the Lugano Convention came
within that context.
C. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CONVENTION
10. According to a report produced by Mr Johnsen for
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe (document 5774 of 9 September 1987 
FDO C5774), 'the Member States of EFTA and the
EEC now make up a vast market of 350 million
European consumers. With a few exceptions
industrial products circulate within this area with-
out being subject to custom duties or quantitative
restrictions. It is the largest market in the world
surpassing the United States market (240 million)
and the Japanese market (120 million).'
It thus became apparent that this economic cooper-
ation between the two groupings of European
States ought to be strengthened through a conven-
tion on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments.
In this connection, the Brussels Convention was
considered to embody a nurpber of principles
which could serve to strengthen judicial and
economic cooperation between the States involved.No. C 189/64 Official Journal of the European Communities 28.
The aim of the Brussels Convention is to simplify
the formalities needed for mutual recognition and
enforcement of court decisions. For this reason the
Convention begins by specifying the rules of ju-
risdiction regarding the courts before which pro-
ceedings are to be brought in civil and commercial
matters relating to property. The Convention goes
on to lay down a procedure for the enforcement of
judgments given in another Member State which is
simpler than traditional arrangements and swift
because the initial stages are non-adversarial.
The Brussels Convention and the 1971 Protocol on
its interpretation by the Court of Justice have both
assumed considerable practical importance:
hundreds of decisions based on the Convention
have been given in the Member States and there is
a series of interpretative judgments of the Court
(see Chapter VI).
Because of the magnitude of trade between the
EEC Member States and EFT A, it was to be
expected that the need would arise for a judgment
given in a Community Member State to be
enforced in an EFTA country, or for a judgment
given in an EFT A member country to be enforced
in a Member State of the European Communities.
D. BACKGROUND TO THE CONVENTION
II. In 1973, when discussions over the accession of
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom to the
Brussels Convention were under way, the Swedish
Government indicated its interest in the creation of
contractual links between the Community Member
States on the one hand, and Sweden plus other
countries which might be interested on the other
hand, with a view to facilitating the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and com-
mercial matters.
In 1981, the Swiss Mission to the European Com-
munities took up the Swedish Government's initia-
tive and inquired of the competent authorities of
the Commission whether and on what terms the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil
and commercial matters between the Member
States of the Communities and Switzerland could
be facilitated along the lines of the Brussels Con-
vention of 27 September 1968. The inquiry was
renewed in April 1982 to Mr Thorn, President of
the Commission, by Mr Furgler Member of the
Swiss Federal Council.
In January 1985, acting on the instructions of the
Council of the European Communities, an  ad hoc
working party met to examine, on the basis of a
paper submitted by the Commission, the possibility
of organizing negotiations with the EFT A countries
with a view to extending the Brussels Convention.
With the assistance of the Council Secretariat and
the Commission departments, preliminary talks
were entered into with the Member States of EFT 
in order to establish whether an extension of the
Brussels Convention could be envisaged.
It emerged that Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Fin-
land, and subsequently Iceland, were in favour of
opening negotiations on the drafting of a parallel
Convention to the Brussels Convention.
At the end of this exploratory stage, the representa-
tives of the Governments of the EEC Member
States, meeting in the Permanent Representatives
Committee in May 1985, noted that all the condi-
tions obtained for negotiations to be initiated. They
therefore agreed to issue an invitation to the EFT 
Member States to take part in such negotiations.
A working party made up of governmental experts
from the Member States of the European Commu-
nities and experts appointed by the EFT A Member
States was set up to this end. The working party
met for the first time on 8 and 9 October 1985
under the alternating chairmanship of Mr Voyame
Director at the Ministry of Justice of the Swiss
Confederation, and Mr Saggio, Counsellor at the
Italian Court of Appeal. A delegation sent by the
Austrian Government attended the negotiations in
an observer capacity, as did representatives of The
Hague Conference. The working party also
appointed two rapporteurs, Mr P. Jenard, at the
time Director of Administration at the Belgian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for the Member States
of the European Communities and Mr Moller, at
that time Counsellor on Legislation to the Finnish
Ministry of Justice and now President of the Court
of First Instance in Toijala, for the EFT A Member
States.
The working party s discussions lasted two years
during which a preliminary draft Convention was
prepared for use as the basic document for a
diplomatic conference.
An overall assessment of the results achieved by
the working party can be nothing if not positive
since wide consensus was reached with regard to
the draft Convention, to the Protocols which sup-
plement it and are an integral part thereof, and to
three Declarations.
At all events, the conclusion of a multilateral Con-
vention between a number of States offers better
prospects of legal certainty and practical conveni-
ence than a series of bilateral, and inescapably
divergent, agreements. The Convention also opens
the way towards implementation of a common sys-28. 7. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 189/65
tem of interpretation, a point which is specifically
mentioned in Protocol 2.
Another possibility might have been for the EFT 
Member States to accede to the Brussels Conven-
tion. This possibility was not followed up because
being based on Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome
and being the subject of the Protocol of 3 June
1971 which entrusted the Court of Justice of the
European Communities with the power to interpret
the Convention, the Brussels Convention is a Com-
munity instrument and it would have been difficult
to ask non-Member States to become signatories.
12. The draft Convention and the other instruments
drawn up by the working party were submitted to a
diplomatic conference held, at the invitation of the
Swiss Federal Government, in Lugano from 12 to
16 September 1988. All the Member States of the
European Communities and of the European Free
Trade Association were represented at this confer-
ence. Certain amendments were made to the drafts
prepared by the working party. In accordance with
the Final Act of the conference (see Annex III), the
representatives of all the States concerned adopted
the final texts of the Convention, the three Proto-
cols and the three Declarations.
On 16 September 1988, the date of opening for sig-
nature, the required signatures were appended by
the representatives of 10 States, that is, for the
Member States of the European Communities, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and
Portugal, and for the Member States of EFT A, Ice-
land, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. The Con-
vention was signed by Finland on 30 November
1988 and by the Netherlands on 7 February 1989.
3. IDENTITY OF STRUCTURE BElWEEN THE
BRUSSE~S CONVENTION AND THE LUGANO
CONVENTION - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
13. The two Conventions are based on identical funda-
mental principles which can be summarized as fol-
lows:
First principle:
The scope of the two Conventions as determined
ratione materiae  is confined to civil and commer-
cial matters relating to property. The two Conven-
tions have the same Article 
Second principle:
Both Conventions fall into the 'double treaty' cate-
gory, that is to say they contain rules of direct ju-
risdiction. These rules are applicable in the State in
which the initial proceedings are brought and serve
to determine the court vested with jurisdiction
whereas 'simple treaties' merely contain rules of
indirect jurisdiction which do not apply until the
stage of recognition and enforcement has been
reached.
Third principle:
A defendant's domicile is the point on which the
rules on jurisdiction hinge. For the purposes of the
1978 Accession Convention, the United Kingdom
and Ireland adjusted their legislation to align their
concept of domicile on that of many continental
countries (4). Proceedings against any person domi-
ciled in the territory of a Contracting State must
save where the Conventions provide otherwise, be
brought before the courts of that State. Under no
circumstances may rules of exorbitant jurisdiction
be invoked as arguments (Articles 2 and 3).
However, where a defendant is not domiciled in
the territory of a Contracting State jurisdiction con-
tinues to be determined in each State by the law of
that State. Furthermore, persons domiciled in the
territory of a Contracting State may, regardless of
their nationality, avail themselves of the rules of
jurisdiction which apply in that State, including
exorbitant jurisdiction (Article 4), in the same way
as nationals of that State.
Fourth principle:
Both Conventions contain precise and detailed
rules of jurisdiction specifying the instances in
which a person domiciled in a Contracting State
may be sued in the courts of another Contracting
State.
In this respect, the structures of the two Conven-
tions are again identical, these rules being con-
tained in the following sections.
(a)  Additional rules of jurisdiction
Title II, Section 2 (Articles 5 and 6) contains addi-
tional rules of jurisdiction in that the courts therein
specified are not mentioned in Article 2. The sec-
tion relates to proceedings which can be consid-
ered as having a particularly close link with the
court before which proceedings are brought.
The rules of jurisdiction set out in this section are
special because, in general, both Conventions
directly specify which court has jurisdiction.
As will be seen below, there are certain differences
between the Brussels Convention and the LuganoNo. C 189/66 Official Journal of the European Communities 28.
Convention with regard to the provisions con-
tained in this section (see Article 5 (l) and Article 6
(4), points 36 to 44, 46 and 47).
(b)  Mandatory rules
Both Conventions contain mandatory rules on ju-
risdiction in matters relating to insurance (Section
3) and consumer contracts (Section 4), the primary
objective of which is to protect the weaker party.
The rules are mandatory in that the parties are not
permitted to depart from them before a dispute has
arisen. These sections are the same in both Con-
ventions.
( c)  Exclusive jurisdiction
Both Conventions contain rules of exclusive juris-
diction (Section 5, Article 16):
(a) in some cases, disputes must be brought before
the courts of a given State (rights  in rem  , or
tenancies of, immovable property; validity,
nullity or dissolution of companies; validity of
entries in public registers; registration or valid-
ity of patents, trade marks and designs; pro-
ceedings concerned with the enforcement of
judgments);
(b) the parties are not permitted to waive the ju-
risdiction of the competent courts, either by an
agreement conferring jurisdiction even 
entered into after a dispute has arisen (Article
17), or by submission to the. jurisdiction
(Article 18);
(c) a court of a State other than the State whose
courts have exclusive jurisdiction must declare
of its own motion, that it has no jurisdiction
(Article 19);
(d) breach of the rules constitutes grounds for
refusing recognition and enforcement (Articles
28 and 34);
(e) the rules apply whether or not the defendant is
domiciled in a Contracting State.
The only difference between the two Conventions
relates to tenancies of immovable property (see
points 49 to 54).
(d)  Prorogation of jurisdiction
The two Conventions also contain rules of proro-
gation of jurisdiction by agreement or tacitly (Title
I I, Section 6, Articles 17 and 18). The Conventions
differ in the case of Article 17 (prorogation by
agreement  see points 55 to 61) but not in the
case of Article 18 (submission to jurisdiction).
(e)  Lis pendens and related actions
Both Conventions contain provisions on the case
of a  lis pendens  (Article 21) and related actions
(Article 22) in Section 8, the aim of which is to
avoid conflicting judgments. The wordings differ
slightly here with regard to a  lis pendens  (see point
62).
Fifth principle:
The defendant's rights must have been respected in
the State of origin.
Both Conventions provide in the first paragraph of
Article 20, the importance of which should 
emphasized, that if a defendant does not enter an
appearance the court must declare of its own
motion that it has no jurisdiction unless its jurisdic-
tion is derived from the provisions of the Conven-
tion.
The second and third paragraphs of Article 20
cover the problem of notification of legal docu-
ments to the defendant, the court being obliged to
stay its proceedings so long as it has not been
shown that the defendant was able to receive the
document instituting the proceedings in sufficient
time to enable him to arrange for his defence. This
Article has not been amended.
Sixth principle:
Grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement
are limited.
Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 26 of both
Conventions judgments given in a Contracting
State must be recognized in the other Contracting
States without any special procedure being
required. In other words, judgments are entitled to
automatic recognition: the Conventions establish
the presumption in favour of recognition and the
only grounds for refusal are those listed in Articles
27 and 28.
There are two conditions which agreements such as
this usually contain but which these two Conven-
tions omit: recognition does not require that the
foreign judgment should have become  res judicata
and the jurisdiction of the court in the State of ori-
gin is no longer examined by the court of the State
in which enforcement is being sought. In this res-
pect there are some differences between the two
Conventions with regard to Article 28 (see points
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Seventh principle:
The enforcement procedure is unified and simpli-
fied.
It is unified in that, in every Contracting State, the
procedure is initiated by submission of an applica-
tion.
It is simplified in particular with reference to the
appeals procedure.
The Lugano Convention makes a number of tech-
nical adjustments as against the 1968 Convention
(see points 68 to 70).
Eighth principle:
The Conventions govern relations with other inter-
national Conventions. On this point, and with
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regard to Conventions concluded on particular
matters, there are a few differences between the
two Conventions (see points 79 to 82).
Ninth principle:
Steps are taken to ensure that interpretation of the
two Conventions is uniform.
Interpretation of the 1968 Convention is entrusted
to the Court of Justice by the Luxembourg Protocol
of 3 June 1971.
Interpretation of the Lugano Convention is gov-
erned by Protocol 2 to that Convention (see points
110 to 119).
RESPECTIVE SCOPE OF THE BRUSSELS CONVENTION AND THE LUGANO
CONVENTION
(Article 54b)
14. As shown above, although the structure of the two
Conventions is identical and they contain a great
number of comparable provisions, they remain
separate Conventions.
15. The respective application of the two Conventions
is governed by Article 54b. The first point to note is
that this Article primarily concerns the courts of
member countries of the European Communities
these being the only courts which may be required
to deliver judgments pursuant to either Conven-
tion. Courts in EFT A Member States are not
bound by the Brussels Convention since the EFT A
States are not parties to that Convention.
However, Article 54b is relevant for the courts of
EFT A countries since it was felt advantageous that
Article 54b should, for reasons of clarity, contain
details relating to the case of a  lis pendens,  related
actions and recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments.
The philosophy of Article 54b is as follows:
According to paragraph  the Brussels Convention
continues to apply in relations between Member
States of the European Communities.
This applies in particular where:
(a) a person, of whatever nationality, domiciled in
one Community State, e.g. France, is sum-
moned to appear before a court in another
such State, e.g. Italy. The plaintiffs nationality
and domicile are immaterial;
(b) a judgment has been delivered in one Euro-
pean Community Member State, e.g. France
and must be recognized or enforced in another
such State, e.g. Italy.
The Brussels Convention also applies where a per-
son domiciled outside the territory of a European
Community Member State and outside the territory
of any other State party to the Lugano Convention
g. in the United States, is summoned to appear
before a court in a European Community Member
State (Article 4 of the Brussels Convention).
In each of these three instances, the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Communities has jurisdiction
under the 1971 Protocol to rule on problems which
may arise with regard to the interpretation of the
Brussels Convention.
16. However, under paragraph 2, the court of a Euro-
pean Community Member State must apply the
Lugano Convention where:
(1) a defendant is domiciled in the territory of a
State which is party to the Lugano Convention
and an EFT A member or is deemed to be so
domiciled under Articles 8 or 13 of the Con-
vention. For instance, if a person domiciled in
Norway is summoned before a French court
jurisdiction will be vested in that court only in
the cases for which the Lugano ConventionNo. C 189/68 Official Journal of the European Communities 28. 7. 90
provides. In particular the rules of exorbitant
jurisdiction provided for in Article 4 of the
Brussels Convention may not be relied on as
against that person;
(2) the courts of an EFT A Member State possess
exclusive jurisdiction (Article 16) or jurisdic-
tion by prorogation (Article 17). The courts of
Member States of the European Communities
may not, for instance, be seised of a dispute
relating to rights  in rem  in immovable property
situated in the territory of a State party to the
Lugano Convention and an EFT A Member
State, notwithstanding Article 16 (1) of the
Brussels Convention, which will apply only if
the immovable property is situated in the terri-
tory of a State party to the 1968 Convention;
(3) recognition or enforcement of a judgment
delivered in a State party to the Lugano Con-
vention and an EFT A Member State is being
sought in a Community Member State (para-
graph 2 (c)).
Paragraph 2 also provides that the Lugano
Convention applies where a judgment
delivered in a Community Member State is to
be enforced in an EFTA Member State party to
the Lugano Convention.
This does not resolve potential conflicts
between the two Conventions, but it does
define their respective scope. Obviously if a
judgment has been delivered in a State party to
the Lugano Convention and an EFT A Member
State and is to be enforced either in a Com-
munity Member State or in an EFT A Member
State, the Brussels Convention does not apply;
(4) Article 54b also contains provisions relating 
lis pendens  (Article 21) and related actions
(Article 22). Under Article 54b (2) (b) a court in .
a Community Member State must apply these
Articles of the Lugano Convention if a court in
an EFT A Member State is seised of the same
dispute or a related claim.
Apart from the greater clarity which they bring,
these provisions serve a double purpose: to
remove all uncertainty, and to ensure that
judgments delivered in the different States
concerned do not conflict;
(5) Article 54b (3) provides that a court in 
EFT A Member State may refuse recognition 
enforcement of a judgment delivered by a
court in a Community Member State if the
grounds on which the latter court has based its
jurisdiction are not provided for in the Lugano
Convention and if recognition or enforcement
is being sought against a party who is domi-
ciled in any EFT A Contracting State.
These grounds for refusal are additional to
those provided for in Article 28, and arise
essentially from a guarantee sought by the
EFT A Member States. The cases involved can
be expected to arise relatively seldom, since the
Conventions are so similar in respect of their
rules of jurisdiction. The possibility neverthe-
less remains. The case would arise in the event
of a judgment on a contract of employment
delivered by a court in a Community Member
State which had erroneously based its jurisdic-
tion with regard to a person domiciled in an
EFT A Member State either on Article 4 or
Article 5 (l) of the Brussels Convention, i.e. in
a manner inconsistent with Article 5 (1) of the
Lugano Convention, which includes a specific
provision on contracts of employment, or on
an agreement conferring jurisdiction which
predated the origin of the dispute (Article 17).
However, in the interests of freedom of move-
ment of judgments, the judgment will be recog-
nized and enforced provided that this can be
done in accordance with the rules of common
law of the State addressed, in particular its
common law rules on the jurisdiction of for-
eign courts;
(6) for convenience, we have used the term 'EFT A
Member States in the above examples.
Obviously, the same arrangements would
apply to States which are not members 
either the EEC or EFT A but accede to the
Lugano Convention (see Article 62 (I) (b)).
17. The question remained unresolved as to how the
Lugano Convention would apply between Com-
munity Member States one of which was not a
party to the Brussels Convention such as, for ins-
tance, Spain or Portugal, while both were parties to
the Lugano Convention. The issue would, for
example, arise should both Belgium and Spain28. Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 189/69
become parties to the Lugano Convention before
the Treaty on the accession of Spain to the Brussels
Convention has been concluded or has entered
into force and should enforcement of a judgment
delivered in one of these States be requested in the
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other. In the rapporteurs' OpInIOn, the Lugano
Convention would, as a source of law, apply in the
case in point pending entry into force between Bel-
gium and ~pain of the Treaty on the accession of
Spain to the Brussels Convention.
PROVISIONS WHICH DISTINGUISH THE LUGANO CONVENTION FROM THE
BRUSSELS CONVENTION
1. SUMMARY OF THESE PROVISIONS
18. The amendments are not numerous. Before consi-
dering them in detail it might be helpful to list the
Articles in the Lugano Convention which differ
from the corresponding Articles in the Brussels
Convention.
Article 
This Article adds the rules of exorbitant jurisdic-
tion current in the EFT A Member States and in
Portugal. It should be noted that no such rules exist
in Spain.
Article  5 (1)
special provision has been inserted covering
matters relating to contracts of employment. 
Article 
A new paragraph 4 relates to the combination of
proceedings  in rem  with proceedings  in personam.
Article 
Matters relating to tenancies in immovable pro-
perty are the subject of a new provision (paragraph
1 (b)) and of a reservation (Protocol No 1, Article Ib).
Article 
This Article has been amended with regard to the
reference to commercial practices and contracts of
employment.
Article 
The reference in this Article to  /is pendens  has been
somewhat amended.
Article 
This Article now contains further grounds for refus-
ing recognition and enforcement.
Articles  31  to 
Technical modifications have been made to some
of these Articles with regard to procedure for
enforcement and modes of appeal.
Article 50
The wording of this Article, which concerns
authentic instruments, has been slightly altered.
Article 
This Article has been clarified. with regard to the
transitional provisions.
Article 54A
This Article is based on Article 36 of the 1978
Accession Convention and contains additions.
Article 54B
This is a new Article governing the respective scope
of the Brussels Convention and the Lugano Con-
vention.
Article 
This Article concerns relations with other conven-
tions and refers only to conventions to which
EFTA Member States are party.
Article 
This Article governs implementation of conven-
tions concluded with regard to particular matters
and differs appreciably from Article 57 of the Brus-
sels Convention.
Articles 60 to  68 (Final provisions)
These Articles have been amended.
19. Protocoll
Article fa
This new Article contains a reservation requested
by the Swiss delegation.No. C 189/70 Official Journal of the European Communities 28. 7. 90
Article Ib TITLE II
This new Article contains a reservation resulting
from the amendment of Article 16 (1) relating to
tenancies in immovable property.
A rticle V
This Article covers actions on a warranty or gua-
rantee and contains additions covering current le-
gislation in several States.
Article Va
The Article covers maintenance matters in parti-
cular and contains additions to take account of the
situation in several States.
A rticle Vb
This Article covers disputes between the master
and a member of the crew of a vessel and again
contains additions to take account of the laws in a
number of States.
20.  Protocol 2
This Protocol has been added in order to ensure
that, as far as possible, the Lugano Convention and
the provisions therein which are identical to the
Brussels Convention are interpreted uniformly.
21.  Protocol 3
This Protocol deals with the problem of Com-
munityacts.
22.  Declarations
First Declaration:  supplementary to Protocol 3.
Second and Third Declarations:  supplementary to
Protocol 2 on the uniform interpretation of the
Lugano Convention.
2. DETAILED EXAMINATION
TITLE I
SCOPE OF THE LUGANO CONVENTION
(Article 1)
23. Since this differs in no respect from the Brussels
Convention, the reader is referred to the Jenard
and Schlosser reports.
JURISDICTION (Articles 2 to 24)
Section 
General provisions  (Articles 2 to 4)
(a)  Introductory remarks
24. The proposed adaptations to Articles 2 to 4 are
confined to mentioning, in the second paragraph
of Article 3, certain exorbitant jurisdictions in the
legal systems of the EFT A Member States and of
Portugal. A brief explanation of the proposed addi-
tional provisions (see point 1) precedes, as in the
Schlosser  report, two more general remarks on the
relevance of these provisions to the whole structure
of the Lugano Convention.
(b)  Exorbitant jurisdictional bases in force in the
EFT A Member States and Portugal
l. Austria
25. Article 99 of the Law on Court Jurisdiction (Juris-
diktionsnorm) provides that any person neither
domiciled nor ordinarily resident in Austria may,
in matters relating to property, be sued in the court
for any place where he has assets or where the dis-
puted property is located. The value of the assets
located in Austria may, however, not be considera-
bly lower than the value of the matter in dispute.
Foreign establishments, foundations, companies
cooperatives and associations may, according to
the abovementioned Article (paragraph 3), also be
sued in the court for the place where they have
their permanent representation for Austria or an
agency.
2. Finland
26. The second sentence of Article 1 of Chapter 10 of
the Finnish Code of Judicial Procedure provides
that a person who has no habitual residence in Fin-
land may be sued in the court of the place where
the documents instituting the proceeding were
served on him or in the court of the place where he
has assets. The third sentence of the same Article
provides that a Finnish national who is staying
abroad may also be sued in the court for the place
where he had his last residence in Finland. The
fourth sentence of the same Article provides that a
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ence in Finland may, unless there is a special prov-
ision to the contrary as to nationals of a particular
State, be sued in the court for the place where the
documents instituting the proceedings were served
on him or in the court for the place where he has
assets.
3. Iceland
27. Article 77 of the Icelandic Civil Proceedings Act
provides that in matters relating to property obliga-
tions to Icelandic citizens, firms etc. any person not
domiciled in that country may be sued in the court
for the place where the person was when the docu-
ments instituting the proceedings were served on
him or where he has assets.
4. Norway
28. Article 32 of the Norwegian Civil Proceedings Act
provides that any person not domiciled in Norway
may be sued, in matters relating to property, in the
court for the place where he has assets or where the
disputed property is located at the time when the
documents instituting the proceedings were served
on him.
5. Sweden
29. The first sentence of Section 3 of Chapter 10 of the
Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure provides that
anyone without a known domicile in Sweden may
be sued, in matters concerning payment of a debt
in the court for the place where he has assets.
6. Switzerland
30. Article 40 of the Federal Law on Private Interna-
tional Law states that if there is no other provision
on jurisdiction in Swiss law an action concerning
sequestration may be brought before the court for
the place where the goods were attached in Switzer-
land.
7. Portugal
31. Article 65 of Chapter II of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure provides that a foreign national may be sued
in a Portuguese court where:
(paragraph 1 (c)) the plaintiff is Portuguese
and, if the situation were reversed, he could be
sued in the courts of the State of which the
defendant is a national
(paragraph 2) under Portuguese law, the court
with jurisdiction would be that of the defend-
ant' s domicile, if the latter is a foreigner who
has been resident in Portugal for more than six
months or who is fortuitously on Portuguese
territory provided that, in the latter case, the
obligation which is the subject of the dispute
was entered into in Portugal.
Article 65a (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure con-
fers exclusive jurisdiction on Portuguese courts for
actions relating to employment relationships if any
of the parties is of Portuguese nationality.
Article  11  of the Code of Labour Procedure gives
jurisdiction to Portuguese labour courts for dis-
putes concerning a Portuguese worker where the
contract was concluded in Portugal.
( c)  The relevance of the second paragraph of Article
to the whole structure of the Lugano Conven-
tion
Scope of the second paragraph of
Article 3
32. The rejection as exorbitant of jurisdictional bases
hitherto considered to be important in the various
States should not, any more than the second para-
graph of Article 3 of the 1968 Brussels Convention
mislead anyone as regards the scope of the first
paragraph of Article 3. Only particularly extrava-
gant claims to international jurisdiction for the
courts of a Contracting State are expressly under-
lined. Other rules founding jurisdiction in the
national laws of the Contracting States also remain
compatible with the Lugano Convention only to
the extent that they do not offend against Article 2
and Articles 4 to 18. Thus, for example, the juris-
diction of Swedish courts in respect of persons
domiciled in a Contracting State can no longer be
based, in contractual matters, on the fact that the
contract was entered into in Sweden.
Impossibility of founding juris-
diction on the location of property
33. With regard to Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ger-
many, Iceland Norway, Sweden and the United
Kingdom, the list in the second paragraph of
Article 3 contains provisions rejecting jurisdiction
derived solely from the existence of property in the
territory of the State in which the court is situated.
Such jurisdiction cannot be invoked even if the
proceedings concern a dispute over rights of own-
ership, or possession or the capacity to dispose of
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34. With regard to Switzerland, the list in the second
paragraph contains a provision rejecting jurisdic-
tion derived solely from an attachment of property
located in Switzerland. There is, however, no obsta-
cle for Swiss courts pursuant to Article 24, to grant
such provisional, including protective, measures as
may be available under the law of Switzerland
even if, under the Convention, the courts of
another Contracting State have jurisdiction as to
the substance of the matter.
35. As regards persons who are domiciled outside the
Contracting States, the provisions which hitherto
governed the jurisdiction of courts in the Contract-
ing States remain unaffected. Even the rules on ju-
risdiction mentioned in the second paragraph of
Article 3 may continue to apply to such persons.
Judgments delivered by courts which thus have ju-
risdiction must also be recognized and enforced in
other Contracting States unless one of the excep-
tions in paragraph 5 of Article 27 or in Article 59 of
the Convention applies.
The latter provision is the only one concerning
which the list in Article 3 second paragraph is not
only of illustrative significance, but has direct and
restrictive importance.
Section 2
Special jurisdiction  (Articles 5 and 6)
(a)  A rtide  (I)  Contract of employment
36. The domicile of the defendant constitutes the basic
rule of both the Brussels Convention and the
Lugano Convention.
However, Section 2 (Articles 5 and 6) of Title II on
jurisdiction contains a number of supplementary
provisions. Under these provisions, the plaintiff
may choose to bring the action in the court speci-
fied in Section 2, or in the courts of the State in
which the defendant is domiciled (Article 2).
Article 5 (I) of the Brussels Convention provides
that the defendant may be sued 'in matters relating
to a contract, in the courts for the place of perform-
ance of the obligation in question
37. This paragraph is applicable with regard to a con-
tract of employment (see Jenard report
, p.
24 and
Chapter VI: judgment of the Court of Justice of 
November 1979 in Sanicentral v. Collin, according
to which employment legislation comes within the
Convention s scope). When asked to give a ruling
on this matter, the Court of Justice ruled that the
obligation to be taken into account in the case of
claims based on different obligations arising under
a contract of employment as a representative bind-
ing a worker to an undertaking was the obligation
which characterized the contract, i.e. that of the
place where the work was carried out (judgment of
the Court of 26 May 1982 in Ivenel v. Schwab, see
Chapter VI).
This ruling was based amongst other things, on
Article 6 of the Rome Convention on the law
applicable to contractual obligations (OJ No L 266
1980, p. 1), which provides that in matters relating
to an employment contract, the contract 'is to be
governed, in the absence of choice of the appli-
cable law, by the law of the country in which the
employee habitually carries out his work in per-
formance of the contract, unless it appears that the
contract is more closely connected with another
country . In the above judgment, the Court com-
mented that the aim of this provision was to secure
adequate protection for the party who from the
socioeconomic point of view was to be regarded as
the weaker in the contractual relationship (see also
Giuliano-Lagarde report, OJ No C 282, 1982
25).
In another ruling, the Court of Justice observed
that contracts of employment, like other contracts
for work other than on a self-employed basis, dif-
fered from other contracts  even those for the
provision of services - by virtue of certain particu-
larities: they created a lasting bond which brought
the worker to some extent within the organizational
framework of the business of the undertaking or
employer, and they were linked to the place where
the activities were pursued, which determined the
application of mandatory rules and collective
agreements (judgment of 15 January 1987 in Shen-
avai v. Kreischer, see Chapter VI).
During negotiation of the Lugano Convention the
EFT A Member States requested that, in respect of
Article 5 and Article 17 (for this last Article, see
point 60), matters relating to employment contracts
should be the subject of a separate provision.
This request was granted.
38. Under the new Article 5 (1) on matters relating to
contracts of employment, the place of performance
of the obligation in question is deemed to be that
where the employee habitually carries out his work.
If he does not habitually carry out his work in any
one country, the place is that in which is situated
the place of business through which he was
engaged. It should be noted that such an issue is
currently before the Court of Justice (see Chapter
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As we have seen, this provision is in line with the
previous judgments of the Court of Justice corres-
ponding quite closely to Article 6 of the Rome
Convention (5).
39. The stipulation in Article 5 (1) gives rise to the fol-
lowing comments:
According to the general structure of the Lugano
Convention, the following have jurisdiction where
there are disputes between employers and employ-
ees:
the courts of the State in which the defendant
is domiciled (Article 2),
the courts specified in Article 5 (1). If an
employee habitually carries out his work in the
same country, but not in any particular place
the internal law of that country will determine
the court which has jurisdiction
courts on which jurisdiction has been con-
ferred by an agreement entered into after the
dispute has arisen (see Article 17 (5)),
courts whose jurisdiction is implied by submis-
sion (Article 18).
However, these rules do not apply unless the dis-
pute contains an extraneous element. The Conven-
tions only lay down rules of international jurisdic-
tion (see preamble). They have no effect if the
contract (domicile of the employer, domicile of the
employee and place of work) is actually situated in
a single country. In this connection, the employee
nationality must not be taken into account, as the
employee must be treated in the same way as other
employees.
On the other hand, if the defendant is domiciled
outside the territory of one of the Contracting
States, Article 4 is applicable.
40. Where the defendant does not habitually carry out
his work in anyone country, the courts of the place
in which the place of business through which he
was engaged is situated will have jurisdiction. This
system is in keeping with that laid down by Article
6 (2) (b) of the Rome Convention on the law appli-
cable to contractual obligations.
The purpose of the provision is to avoid increasing
the number of courts with jurisdiction in disputes
between employers and employees where the
employee is required to carry out his work in sev-
eral countries. In addition, for States parties to the
Rome Convention and the Lugano Convention
jurisdiction will be congruent with the applicable
law. The same applies in some States which are not
parties to the Rome Convention.
41. The question whether a contract of employment
exists is not settled by the Convention. If the judge
to whom the matter has been referred gives an
affirmative reply to this question, he will have to
apply the second part of Article 5 (1), which consti-
tutes a specific provision. Although there is as yet
no independent concept of what constitutes a con-
tract of employment, it may be considered that it
presupposes a relationship of subordination of the
employee to the employer (see Chapter VI, judg-
ments in Shenavai v. Kreischer, cited earlier, and in
Arcado v. Haviland of 8 March 1988).
42. Article 5 (1) refers only to individual employment
relationships, and not to collective agreements
between employers and workers' representatives.
43. The term 'place of business' is to be understood in
the broad sense; in particular, it covers any entity
such as a branch or an agency with no legal person-
ality.
44. In conclusion, it may be considered that although
the texts of the Brussels Convention and the
Lugano Convention are not identical, they do con-
verge, particularly by reason of the interpretation
by the Court of Justice of Article 5 (1) of the Brus-
sels Convention.
(b)  Article  6 (1)  Co-defendants
45. No change has been made to the text of the Brus-
sels Convention which provides that 'a person
domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued
where he is one of a number of defendants, in the
courts for the place where anyone of them is domi-
ciled' . However, this provision was taken over ver-
batim only in the light of the comments made in
the Jenard report on the 1968 Convention (OJ No
C 59/79, p. 26) to the effect that 'in order for this
rule to be applicable there must be a connection
between the claims made against each of the defen-
dants, as for example in the case of joint debtors. It
follows that action canIlot be brought solely with
the object of ousting the jurisdiction of the courts
of the State in which the defendant is domiciled.' A
few days after the diplomatic conference ended
the Court of Justice delivered a judgment along
these lines (judgment of 27 September 1988 in Kal-
felis v. Schroder, see Chapter VI, OJ No C 281
4. 1 I. 1988, p. 18).No. C 189/74 Official Journal of the European Communities 28. 7. 90
(c)  Article  6 (4)  Combination of actions in rem
and in personam
46. When a person has a mortgage on immovable pro-
perty the owner of that property is quite often also
personally liable for the secured debt. Therefore it
has been made possible in some States to combine
an action concerning the personal liability of the
owner with an action for the enforced sale of the
immovable property. This presupposes of course
that the court for the place where the immovable
property is situated also has jurisdiction as to
actions concerning the personal liability of the
owner.
It was agreed that it was practical that an action
concerning the personal liability of the owner of an
immovable property could be combined with an
action for the enforced sale of the immovable pro-
perty in those States where such a combination of
actions was possible. Therefore it was deemed
appropriate to include in the Convention a provi-
sion according to which a person domiciled in a
Contracting State also may be sued in matters
relating to a contract, if the action may be com-
bined with an action against the same defendant in
matters relating to rights  in rem  in immovable pro-
perty, in the court of the Contracting State in which
the property is situated.
To illustrate, let us assume that a person domiciled
in France is the owner of an immovable property
situated in Norway. This person has raised a loan
which is secured through a mortgage on his immov-
able property in Norway. In the eventuality of the
loan not being repaid when due, if the creditor
wishes to bring an action for the enforced sale of
the immovable property, the Norwegian court has
exclusive jurisdiction under Article 16 (1). How-
ever, under the present provision, this court also
has jurisdiction as to an action against the owner of
the property concerning his personal liability for
the debt, if the creditor wishes to combine the latter
action with an action for the enforced sale of the
property.
47. It is evident that this jurisdictional basis cannot
exist by itself. It must necessarily be supplemented
by legal criteria which determine on which condi-
tions such a combination is possible. Thus the
provisions already existing in or which in the future
may be introduced into the legal systems of the
Contracting States with reference to the combining
of the abovementioned actions remain unaffected
by the Lugano Convention. It goes without saying
however that the combination of the two actions
which this paragraph deals with have to be insti-
tuted by the 'same claimant'. The 'same claimant'
includes of course also a person to whom another
person has transferred his rights or his successor.
Sections 3 and 4
Jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance
(Articles 7 to 12a) and over consumer contracts
(Articles 13 to 15)
48. Since no amendments have been made to these
sections, reference should be made to the Jenard
and Schlosser reports.
Section 5
Exclusive jurisdiction
Article  16 (1)  Tenancies
49. Under Article 16 (1) of the Brussels Convention
only courts of the Contracting State in which the
immovable property is situated have jurisdiction
concerning rights  in rem  , or tenancies of, immov-
able property. Thus the wording covers not only all
disputes concerning rights  in rem  in immovable
property, but also those relating to tenancies of
such property. According to the Jenard report (p.
35), the Committee which drafted the Brussels
Convention intended to cover disputes between
landlord and tenant over the existence or interpre-
tation of tenancy agreements, compensation for
damage caused by the tenant, eviction, etc. The
rule was, according to the same report, not
intended by the Committee to apply to proceedings
concerned only with the recovery of rent, since
such proceedings can be considered to relate to a
subject-matter which is quite distinct from the
rented property itself.
The working party which drafted the Convention
on the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to the Brussels Convention and to the Pro-
tocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice
was, however, according to the Schlosser report
(paragraph 164), unable to agree whether actions
concerned only with rent, i.e. dealing simply with
recovery of a debt, are excluded from the scope of
Article 16 (l).
As stated in the Jenard report, the reference to ten-
ancies in Article 16 (l) of the Brussels Convention
includes tenancies of dwellings and of premises for
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holdings. According to the Schlosser report, the
underlying principle of the provision quite clearly
does not require its application to short-term agree-
ments for use and occupation such as, for example
holiday accomodation.
50. The Court of Justice of the European Communities
has ruled that Article 16 (I) does not cover disputes
relating to transfer of an usufructuary right in
immovable property (judgment of 14 December
1977 in Sanders v. Van der Putte, see Chapter VI).
The Court held that Article 16 (1) must not be
interpreted as including an agreement to rent under
a usufructuary lease a retail business carried on in
immovable property rented from a third person by
the lessor. However, departing from the intentions
of the authors of the 1968 Convention, the Court of
Justice recently ruled that the exclusive jurisdiction
provided for in Article 16 (1) also applies to pro-
ceedings in respect of the payment of rent, and that
this includes short-term lettings of holiday homes
(judgment of 18 January 1985 in Rosier v. Rottwin-
kel, see Chapter VI). The Court held that this
exclusive jurisdiction applies to all lettings of
immovable property, even for short term and even
where they relate only to the use and occupation 
a holiday home and that this jurisdiction covers all
disputes concerning the obligations of the landlord
or the tenant under a tenancy, in particular those
concerning the existence of tenancies or the inter-
pretation of the terms thereof, their duration, the
giving up of possession to the landlord, the repair-
ing of damage caused by the tenant or the recovery
of rent and of incidental charges for the consump-
tion of water, gas and electricity. This decision
seems at least partially to be in contradiction with
what, according to the Jenard and Schlosser
reports, was the intention of those who drafted the
Brussels Convention.
51. Having regard especially to the ruling given by the
Court of Justice in the case of Rosier v. Rottwinkel
the EFT A Member States insisted on the inclusion
of a special provision concerning short-term tenan-
cies of immovable property in the Lugano Conven-
tion. As an alternative, these States put forward the
idea of excluding tenancies totally from the scope
of the Convention or particularly from Article 16.
The working party agreed that it was inappropriate
to exclude tenancies altogether from the scope of
the Convention, in view of the importance of this
matter. As to the proposal for excluding tenancies
from Article 16 especially, the delegations of the
Community Member States found such a solution
totally unacceptable as the normal jurisdiction
rules of the Convention would have been appli-
cable to tenancies of immovable property, which
was alien to the whole philosophy existing in this
respect at least in the Community States. Thus the
working party decided to include in Article 16 (I) a
new subparagraph (b) containing a special provi-
sion concerning short-term tenancies.
52. The result of this change is that, where tenancies
are concerned, there will be two exclusive jurisdic-
tions, which might be described as alternative
exclusive jurisdictions. Under subparagraph (a),
the courts of the Contracting State in which the
immovable property is situated will always have
jurisdiction without restriction. However, under
subparagraph (b), in proceedings which have as
their object tenancies of immovable property con-
cluded for temporary private use for a maximum
period of six consecutive months  which covers
particularly holiday lettings  the plaintiff may
also apply to the courts of the Contracting State in
which the defendant is domiciled. This option is
open to him only if the tenant (and not the owner)
is a natural person and if, in addition, neither party
is domiciled in the Contracting State in which the
property is situated.
Legal persons holding tenancies were excluded
since they are generally engaged in co~mercial
transactions.
Furthermore, where one of the parties is domiciled
in the Contracting State in which the prop~rty 
situated, it was considered appropriate to retain the
rule in Article 16 (1) which lays down the principle
of the jurisdiction of the courts of that State.
53. Article 16 (1) (b) did, however, create serious politi-
cal difficulties for certain Community Member
States. In order to overcome these difficulties, the
working party agreed that this provision be accom-
panied by the possibility of a reservation. By
means of this, any Contracting State may declare
that it will neither recognize nor enforce a judg-
ment in respect of a case concerning tenancies of
immovable property, if the immovable property
concerned is situated on its territory even if the ten-
ancy is such as referred to in Article 16 paragraph 
(b) and the jurisdiction of the court which has
given the judgment has been based on the domicile
of the defendant. This reservation is given in
Article Ib of Protocol No l.
This possibility of a reservation only concerns such
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in the State where recognition and enforcement are
sought. If, thus, for instance, Spain makes use of
this possibility, that does not mean that Spain is
entitled to refuse the recognition or enforcement of
a judgment given in proceedings which had as their
object a tenancy referred to in Article 16 (1) (b) if
the immovable property is situated in another State
g. Italy, and the judgment is given by a court in a
third State, where the defendant has his domicile
g. Sweden. Whether the State where the immova-
ble property is situated has made use of the reser-
vation is in this case completely irrelevant.
It was however understood that any State which
wishes to use this reservation may make a narrower
reservation than that provided for. Thus a State
may, for instance, declare that the reservation 
limited to the case where the landlord is a legal
person.
54. Article 16 (1) applies only if the property is situated
in the territory of a Contracting State. The text is
sufficiently explicit on this point. If the property is
situated in the territory of a third State, the other
provisions of the Convention apply, e.g. Article 2 if
the defendant is domiciled in the territory of a
Contracting State, and Article 4 if he is domiciled
in the territory of a third State, etc.
Section 6
Prorogation of jurisdiction (Arti cl es 17 an d 18)
(a)  Article J  Prorogation by an agreement
55.  J.  Paragraph I of this Article essentially concerns
the formal requirements for agreements conferring
jurisdiction. The question of whether an agreement
on jurisdiction has been validly entered into (e.
lack of due consent) is to be regulated by the appli-
cable law (judgment of the Court of Justice of
11 November 1986 in Iveco Fiat v. Van Hool, see
Chapter VI). As to whether such an agreement can
be validly entered into in specific matters it should
be pointed out that the Court of Justice (judgment
of 13 November 1979 in Sanicentral v. Collin, see
Chapter VI) ruled that in matters governed by the
Convention national procedural law was set aside
in favour of the Convention s provisions.
56. According to the original version of Article 17 of
the Brussels Convention, an agreement conferring
jurisdiction must be in writing or evidenced in writ-
ing. In the light of the interpretation of the Court
of Justice of the European Communities in some
of its first judgments concerning Article 17 of the
Brussels Convention (see Chapter VI), the working
party preparing the 1978 Convention on the acces-
sion of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to the Brussels Convention and to the Pro-
tocol of 3 June 1971 on its interpretation by the
Court of Justice was of the opinion that these for-
mal requirements did not cater adequately for the
customs and needs of international trade. There-
fore a relaxation of these formal requirements as
far as agreements on jurisdiction in international
trade or commerce are concerned was felt neces-
sary. According to Article 17 of the Brussels Con-
vention as amended by the 1978 Accession Con-
vention, an agreement conferring jurisdiction may
in international trade or commerce be in a form
which accords with practices in that trade or com-
merce of which the parties are or ought to have
been aware.
57. During the negotiations on the Lugano Conven-
tion, the EFT A Member States, however~ felt that
this provision was too vague and might create legal
uncertainty. Those States feared that Article 17 (1),
as far as agreements on jurisdiction in international
commerce or trade are concerned, might make it
possible to consider an agreement established by
the mere fact that no protest has been launched
against a jurisdiction clause in certain unilateral
statements by one party, for instance in an invoice
or in terms of trade presented as a confirmation of
the contract. Therefore the EFT A Member States
proposed the following amendment of the second
sentence of Article 17 (1):
Such an agreement conferring jurisdiction shall be
either
(a) in writing (or clearly evidenced in writing)
including an exchange of letters, telegrams and
telexes (or other modern means of technical
communications), or
(b) included or incorporated by reference in a bill
of lading or a similar transport document.
The representatives of the Community Member
States found however that this proposal would not
only lead to an excessive amount of rigidity but
would also be in contradiction with the rulings of
the Court of Justice of the European Communities
according to which it should be possible to take
into account particular practices Uudgment of
14 December 1976 in Segoura v. Bonakdarian, see
Chapter VI).28. 7. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 189/77
58. Article 17 (1) (a) of the Lugano Convention is
based on Article 9 paragraph 2 of the 1980 United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (the so-called Vienna Con-
vention). Since the Member States of the EEC and
the EFT A States may become parties to that Con-
vention, the working party found it desirable to
align in this respect the text of Article 17 on the
text of Article 9 paragraph 2 of the Vienna Conven-
tion. The provision can be seen as a compromise
between the two groups of States.
First, according to Article 17 (1) (b) of the Lugano
Convention, an agreement conferring jurisdiction
fulfils the formal requirements if it is in a form that
accords with practices which the parties have estab-
lished between themselves. This is not provided for
in the wording of Article 17 of the Brussels Con-
vention. In the light of the case law of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities (see Chapter
VI), this seems, however, to be the understanding
of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention. The work-
ing party was of the opinion that this understand-
ing should be explicitly reflected in the text of the
Lugano Convention.
Secondly, in international trade or commerce an
agreement conferring jurisdiction fulfills the formal
requirements if it is in a form that accords with a
usage of which the parties are or ought to have
been aware and which in such trade is widely
known to, and regularly observed by, parties to
contracts of the type involved in the particular
trade or commerce concerned.
Thus, even in international trade or commerce, it is
not sufficient that an agreement conferring juris-
diction be in a form which accords with practices
(or a usage) in such trade or commerce of which
the parties are or ought to have been aware. It is
moreover required that the usage shall be, on the
one hand, widely known in international trade or
commerce and, on the other, regularly observed by
parties to contracts of the type involved in the
particular trade or commerce concerned.
In particular, having regard to the words ' intern a-
tionale Handelsbdiuche' and 'usages' which are
used in the German and French versions of Article
17 of the Brussels Convention, it seems that there
are at least no major differences in substance
between the provisions concerned in the two Con-
ventions. In order to ensure a uniform interpreta-
tion it was, however, felt by the EFT A States that
the present wording of paragraph 1 (c) was neces-
sary in the Lugano Convention.
59. Article 17 of the Brussels Convention has given rise
to a considerable number of judgments by the
Court of Justice of the European Communities. In
this connection, readers are referred to Chapter
VI.2, point 12 'Article 17', paragraphs 1 to 12.
However, it should be mentioned in this context
that the Court of Justice has ruled that an agree-
ment between the parties with regard to the place
of performance, which constitutes a ground of ju-
risdiction pursuant to Article 5 (1), is sufficient to
confer jurisdiction without being subject to the for-
mal requirements laid down in Article 17 for proro-
gation of jurisdiction (judgment of 17 January 1980
in ZeIger v. Salinitri, see Chapter VI).
60. 2. Article 17 (5) was proposed by the EFT A Mem-
ber States. It provides that in matters relating to
contracts of employment an agreement conferring
jurisdiction within the meaning of the first para-
graph shall have legal force only if it is entered into
after the dispute has arisen. The background of this
provision is the same as that for Article 5 (1), i.
the protection of the employee, who from the
socioeconomic point of view is regarded as the
weaker in the contractual relationship. It seemed
desirable that it should not be possible for the pro-
tection intended to be given to employees by virtue
of Article 5 (1) to be taken away by prorogation
agreements entered into before the dispute arose.
As in the case of Article 5 (I) this provision applies
only to individual employment relationships and
not to collective agreements concluded between
employers and employees' representatives.
61. During the Diplomatic Conference, stress was laid
on the difference between the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions as regards agreements conferring ju-
risdiction with respect to contracts of employment
and a number of problems were highlighted. The
example given was that of an agreement conferring
jurisdiction which, at the time, was concluded
between parties domiciled in the territory of two
States which had ratified the Brussels Convention.
Under that Convention, prorogation of jurisdiction
by agreement may, as regards a contract of employ-
ment, be effected before the dispute arises.
What happens if, at a later stage, one of the parties
transfers his domicile to an EFTA Member State?
What would be the attitude either of the court in a
Community Member State to which a dispute is
referred on the basis of that agreement conferring
jurisdiction, or of a court in an EFT A Member
State to which a dispute is referred despite the
agreement?
The question was left open and, although the solu-
tions adopted by the Brussels and the Lugano Con-
ventions are not without their merits, might possi-
bly be resolved in the Convention on the accessionNo. C 189/78 Official Journal of the European Communities 28.
of Spain and Portugal to the Brussels Convention
by aligning the Brussels Convention on the Lugano
Convention.
(b)  Article  18  Submission to jurisdiction
62. Discrepancies have been noted between the var-
ious versions of the Brussels Convention. A num-
ber of versions, for example the English and the
German ones, provide that the rule whereby the
court of the Contracting State has jurisdiction does
not apply where appearance was entered ' solely' to
contest the jurisdiction, which restriction is not
included in the French text.
However, no amendment was made to the various
texts in view of a judgment given by the Court of
Justice to the effect that Article 18 applies under
certain conditions where the defendant contests the
court' s jurisdiction and also makes submissions on
the substance of the action (judgment of 24 June
1981 in Elefanten Schuh v. Jacqmain, see Chapter
VI).
Section 7
Examination as to jurisdiction and admissibility
(Articles 19 and 20)
63. Although these Articles correspond to Articles 
and 20 of the Brussels Convention, Article 20
requires some comment, given that it is a particu-
larly important provision where the defendant fails
to enter an appearance (see lenard report, page 39).
A judge required to apply the Lugano Convention
must declare of his own motion that he has no jur-
isdiction unless his jurisdiction is derived from the
provisions of Sections 2 to 6 of Title II of that Con-
vention. For example, a French judge before whom
person domiciled in Norway is required to
appear on the basis of Article 14 of the Code Civil
(jurisdiction derived from the French nationality of
the applicant) must declare of his own motion that
he has no jurisdiction if the defendant fails to enter
an appearance.
Likewise, the judge must declare of his own motion
that he has no jurisdiction unless his jurisdiction is
derived from the provisions of an international
convention governing jurisdiction in particular
matters, as stipulated in Article 57 (2). In this con-
nection reference should be made to the comments
on Article 57.
It should be noted that almost all the Community
and EFT A Member States are currently parties to
the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on
the service abroad of judicial and extra-judicial
documents in civil or commercial matters since, at
1 June 1988, the sole exceptions are Austria, Ire-
land, Iceland and Switzerland.
Section 8
Lis pendens-  related actions (Articles 21 to 23)
64.  Article 
Only this Article has been amended in Section 8.
Article 21 of the Brussels Convention provides that
in case of a  lis alibi pendens.  any court other than
the court first seised must of its own motion
decline jurisdiction in favour of that court and may
stay its proceedings if the jurisdiction of the other
court is contested.
The representatives of the EFTA Member States
thought this solution was too radical.
They observed that an action often had to 
brought in order to comply with a time limit or stop
further time from running, and that opinions dif-
fered as to whether a time limit had been complied
with where an action had been brought before a
court lacking jurisdiction internationally.
Thus, in their view, if an action was brought before
a judge who would have had jurisdiction, but was
not the first to be seised, that judge would of his
own motion have to decline jurisdiction in favour
of the court first seised. However, that court might
perhaps decide that it did not have jurisdiction. In
that case, both actions would have been dismissed
with the result that the time limits might have run
out and the action be time barred.
These remarks have been taken into consideration.
Article 21 has been amended so that the court other
than the court first seised will of its own motion
stay its proceedings until the jurisdiction of the
other court has been established.
A court other than the one first seised will not
decline jurisdiction in favour of the court first
seised until the jurisdiction of the latter has been
established (see Schlosser report, paragraph 176).
The Court of Justice has ruled that the term  lis pen-
dens  used in Article 21 covers a case where a party
brings an action before a court in a Contracting
State for a declaration that an international sales
contract is inoperative or for the termination there-
of whilst an action by the other party to secure per-
formance of the said contract is pending before a
court in another Contracting State (judgment of
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Section 9
65.  Article  24  Provisional, including protective, mea-
sures
As this provision has not been amended, reference
should be made to the Jenard report, page 42 and
the Schlosser report, paragraph 183.
TITLE III
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
(Articles 25 to 49)
Section 
Recognition (Articles 26 to 30)
(a)  Article  27 (5)
66. Article 27 (5) refers only to cases where the judg-
ment recognition of which is requested is irrecon-
cilable in the State addressed with an earlier judg-
ment given in a  non- Contracting  State and recog-
nizable in the State addressed.
The case of a judgment given in a  Contracting
State  which is irreconcilable with an earlier judg-
ment given in another Contracting State and recog-
nizable in the State addressed is not specifically
dealt with, nor is it covered in the Brussels Conven-
tion. It was felt that such cases would be extremely
exceptional given the mechanisms provided for in
Title II and in particular Articles 21 and 22 with a
view to avoiding contradictory decisions. Should
such a case, however, arise it would be for the court
in the State addressed to apply its rules of proce-
dure and the general principles arising out of the
Convention and to refuse to recognize and enforce
the judgment given after the first judgment had
been recognized. It might, indeed, be argued that
since it has already been recognized in the State
addressed, the first judgment should produce the
same effects there as . a judgment given by the
courts in that State, the situation covered by Article
27 (3).
(b)  Article 
67. Two grounds for refusal have been added. They
concern the cases provided in Articles 54B and 57;
reference should be made to the comments on
those Articles.
Section 2
Enforcement (Articles 31 to 45)
(a)  Article 
68. Under the first paragraph of this Article in the
Brussels Convention
, '
A judgment given in a Con-
tracting State and enforceable in that State shall be
enforced in another Contracting State when, on the
application of any interested party, the order for its
enforcement has been issued there . Since United
Kingdom law does not have the exequatur system
for foreign judgments, paragraph 2 of this Article
provides that such a judgment shall be enforced in
England and Wales, in Scotland, or in Northern
Ireland where, on the application of any interested
party, it has been registered for enforcement in that
part of the United Kingdom (see Schlosser report
paragraphs 208  et seq.
69. In Switzerland, a distinction must be drawn
between judgments ordering the payment of a sum
of money and those ordering performance other
than the payment of money. The enforcement of
judgments ordering the payment of a sum 
money is governed by Articles 69  et seq.  of the fed-
erallaw on suit for bankruptcy debts (LP).. rti-eles
80 and 81 LP require, for the purposes of enforce-
ment, the production of an enforceable judgment
in a civil case. In the case of foreign judgments,
involving an order for payment of money, an order
for its enforcement is necessary only if the judg-
ment was given in a State which has not concluded
treaty on recognition and enforcement with
Switzerland. If such a treaty exists, a foreign judg-
ment involving an order for payment of money is
enforceable in the same way as a Swiss judgment.
The only objections which can be raised are those
provided for in the convention in question (third
paragraph of Article 81 LP).
foreign judgment ordering performance other
than the payment of money is enforced under can-
tonal law, even if there is a treaty with the State
concerned. In general, the cantonal rules governing
orders for enforcement are then applicable. With
the convention in mind, Switzerland declared that
it intends to continue to grant the preferential treat-
ment it gives to judgments involving an order for
payment of money.
The working party agreed that the wording of
Article 31 (1) of the Brussels Convention had been
chosen to comply with the legal system of the ori-
ginal six Member States of the European Commu-
nities and acknowledged that this wording could
create problems for States with different enforce-
ment procedures than those existing in these six
States. Therefore and in order to take account, inNo. C 189/80 Official Journal of the European Communities 28. 7. 90
particular, of the Swiss position the words 'the
order for its enforcement has been issued' in the
first paragraph of Article 31 of the Brussels Con-
vention have been replaced in the Lugano Conven-
tion by the words 'it has been declared enforce-
able
(b)  Articles  32  to 
70. The formal adjustments to Articles 32 to 45 relate
exclusively to the courts having jurisdiction and
possible types of appeal against their decisions.
For applications for a declaration of enforceability
of judgments only one court has been given juris-
diction in Iceland and in Sweden. In Sweden, this
is due to the practice according to which the 'Svea
hovratt' is competent to declare enforceable foreign
judgments and arbitral awards.
If the judgment debtor wishes to argue against the
authorization of enforcement, he must lodge his
application to set the enforcement order aside not
with the higher court, as in most other Contracting
States, but as in Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, with the
same court as declared the judgment enforceable.
The proceedings will take the form of an ordinary
contentious civil action. This applies also regarding
the appeal which the applicant may lodge if his
application is refused.
Section 3
Common provisions  (Articles 46 to 48)
71. Since no amendments have been made to the prov-
isions of this section, reference should be made to
the Jenard report (pp. 54 to 56) and the Schlosser
report (paragraph 225).
TITLE IV
AUTHENTIC INSTRUMENTS AND COURT
SETTLEMENTS
(Articles 50 and 51)
Article 50  Authentic instruments
72. The representatives of the EFT A Member States
were able to agree to the text of Article 50
although the concept of an authentic instrument is
contained only in Austria s legislation.
However, they did request that the report should
specify the conditions which had to be fulfilled by
an authentic instrument in order to be regarded as
authentic within the meaning of Article 50 (see
Schlosser report, paragraph 226).
The conditions are as follows:
the authenticity of the instrument should have
been established by a public authority,
this authenticity should relate to the content of
the instrument and not only, for example, the
signature
the instrument has to be enforceable in itself in
the State in which it originates.
Thus, for example, settlements occurring outside
courts which are known in Danish law and
enforceable under that law (udenretlig forlig) do
not fall under Article 50.
Likewise, commercial bills and cheques are not
covered by Article 50.
As in Article 31 (see point 69), the phrase 'have an
order for its enforcement issued there' has been
replaced by the words 'be declared enforceable
It should be noted that the application of Article 50
of the Brussels Convention appears to be relatively
uncommon.
TITLE 
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article  52  Domicile
73. The third paragraph of Article 52 of the Brussels
Convention relates to persons whose domicile
depends on that of another person or on the seat of
an authority.
It adopts a common rule of conflicts based on the
personal status of the person making the applica-
tion, in the case in point, the national law of the
person.
The EFTA Member States challenged this rule
particularly in view of the developments regarding
the domicile of married women that have taken
place since the 1968 Convention was drawn up.
It was decided to delete the third paragraph.
It follows that in order to determine whether the
defendant is a minor or legally incapacitated, the
judge will apply the law specified by the conflicts
rules applied in his country.
In the affirmative case, either the first paragraph or
the second paragraph of Article 52, depending on
the case, will be applied to determine the legal
domicile. Thus, to determine whether a minor is
domiciled in the territory of the State whose courts
are seised of a matter, the judge will apply his
internal law.28. 7. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 189/81
When the minor is domiciled in the territory of the
State whose courts are seised of the matter, the
judge will, in order to determine whether the minor
is domiciled in another Contracting State, apply
the law of that State.
TITLE VI
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
(Articles 54 and 54a)
(a)  Article  54  Temporal application
74. The adjustments made to this Article are only tech-
nical ones, given that the procedures for entry into
force of the two Conventions are not identical, but
that no substantive changes have been made (see
Jenard report
, pp. 
57 and 58 and Schlosser report
paragraphs 228 to 235).
(b)  Article 54a (Maritime claims)
75. Article 54a corresponds to Article 36 of the 1978
Accession Convention (see Schlosser report, para-
graphs 121  et seq.
Paragraph 5 of this Article defines the expression
maritime claim . A maritime claim, according to
this definition , is  inter alia  a claim arising out of
dock charges and dues (point (I)). The German
version of this Convention as well as of the Brus-
sels Convention uses the word 'Hafenabgaben' for
dock charges and dues. This should however not
mislead anybody into thinking that port charges
dues or tolls or similar public fees are regarded as
dock charges or dues for the purposes of this
Article.
TITLE VII
RELATIONSHIP TO THE BRUSSELS CONVEN-
TION AND OTHER CONVENTIONS
(a)  Article 54b (Relationship to the Brussels Conven-
tion)
76. Reference should be made to the comments in
Chapter II.
(b)  Articles  55  and  56  (Conventions concerning the
EFTA Member States)
77. Article 55 lists conventions concluded between the
EFT A Member States and conventions concluded
between EFT A Member States and Community
Member States (see Annex II).
Conventions between Community Member States
have not been included since they are already cov-
ered by Article 55 of the Brussels Convention and
where Spain and Portugal are concerned, will be
covered by the Conventions on Accession to the
Brussels Convention.
78. Article 56 has not been amended.
(c)  Article  57  (Conventions in relation to particular
matters)
79. It may be said that the problem of conflicts of law
together with the problem of conflicts of jurisdic-
tion, are the chief concern of private international
law.
However, the problem of conflicts of convention
also requires attention, since nowadays, with so
many international organizations drawing up inter-
national conventions, the number which deal
directly or indirectly with the same subject is consi-
derable. As for solving the problem, several sys-
tems could perfectly well be contemplated under
international law. Some are based on the principle
specialia generalibus derogant others on the rule of
antecedence. Lastly, yet others advocate taking the
effectiveness criterion into consideration. For
example, where a judgment is to be recognized and
enforced, the conventions which exist might be
considered and the one selected which, translating
the aim sought by the authors of the conventions
gives the party to whom judgment has been
delivered in one country the best possibility of get-
ting it recognized and enforced in another.
As noted by Professor Schlosser in his report (para-
graphs 238 to 246), this question was dealt with at
length during the negotiations on the 1978 Acces-
sion Convention.
The solution was enshrined in Article 25 of that
Convention.
80. The problem was taken up again during negotia-
tion of the Lugano Convention. The same basic
principle has been adopted in both Conventions:
namely, that the Convention will not affect any
conventions to which the Contracting States are or
will be parties and which, in relation to particular
matters, govern jurisdiction or the recognition or
enforcement of judgments (6).
The arrangements adopted are set out in Article 57.
They may be examined on two levels: firstly, theNo. C 189/82 Official Journal of the European Communities 28.
level of jurisdiction, and secondly, that of recogni-
tion and enforcement.
81.  Regarding jurisdiction,  the two Conventions, i.e.
the 1968 Convention as amended by the 1978 Con-
vention, and the Lugano Convention, both contain
similar provisions.
Article 57 (2) of the Lugano Convention, like
Article 25 (2) of the 1978 Accession Convention
provides that the Convention will not prevent a
court of a Contracting State which is party to a
convention relating to a particular matter from
assuming jurisdiction in accordance with that con-
vention, even where the defendant is domiciled in
a State party to the Lugano Convention, but not to
the convention on the particular matter.
In this respect, Article 57 provides another excep-
tion to Article 2, which lays down the principle that
the defendant must be sued in the courts of his
domicile.
Take the following example:
The International Convention for the unification
of certain rules relating to international carriage by
air, signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, has not
been ratified by Luxembourg. The carrier is domi-
ciled in Luxembourg, but the Warsaw Convention
provides that the court with jurisdiction is that of
the place of 'destination ' (a court not adopted 
such  by the Lugano Convention, nor, for that mat-
ter, by the Brussels Convention).
Article 57 enables the applicant to sue the Luxem-
bourg carrier in the court of a State party to the
Lugano Convention and to the Warsaw Conven-
tion, since that court is allowed under that Conven-
tion.
Exactly the same arrangement is adopted in the
Brussels Convention. It is the special convention
which prevails, in the interests, as stated by Profes-
sor Schlosser in his report on the 1978 Convention
(paragraph 240 (b)), of 'simplicity and clarity of the
legal position' and , let us add, so as not to fail to
recognize the rights that nationals of third States
might hold under the special convention.
However, the court seised will have to apply
Article 20 of the Lugano Convention in order to
ensure respect for the rights of the defence.
In the case in point, if the defendant fails to enter
an appearance, the judge must of his own motion
examine whether he does indeed have jurisdiction
under the special convention and whether the
defendant has been sued properly. and in sufficient
time to enable him to arrange his defence.
82.  Regarding recognition and enforcement.  the
arrangements in the Brussels Convention (as
adjusted on this point by the 1978 Convention) and
the Lugano Convention are not the same. Unlike
the Brussels Convention, the Lugano Convention
provides that recognition or enforcement may be
refused if the State addressed is not a contracting
party to the special convention and if the person
against whom recognition or enforcement is sought
is domiciled in that State.
The reason for this difference is that the Brussels
Convention applies between Member States of the
same Community, while the Lugano Convention is
not based on a similar principle.
The EFT A Member States therefore requested that
the courts of the State addressed should be able to
refuse recognition or enforcement if the person
against whom they were sought was domiciled in
that State, on the grounds that such a guarantee
should be granted the defendant, particularly for
fear that the special convention might contain
grounds for jurisdiction considered as exorbitant
by the State addressed in accordance with the law
of that State.
It must be emphasized that this ground for refusal
is an exception, given that paragraph 3 establishes
the principle of recognition and enforcement. It
does not therefore apply automatically, but is left
to the discretion of the judge in the State addressed
under the law of that State.
It goes without saying that a judgment delivered in
an EFT A Member State on the basis of a rule of
jurisdiction provided for in a special convention
might be refused recognition or enforcement, under
the same terms, in a Community Member State.
83. In the OpInIOn of the rapporteurs, although the
question is not expressly dealt with in the text of
Article 57, if a court in a Contracting State having
jurisdiction under a special convention is seised
first, the rules on  lis pendens  and related actions in
Articles 21 and 22 are applicable. Hence, for ins-
tance, in the case of  lis pendens,  the courts of
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State was not party to the special convention, have
to stay their proceedings of their own motion if
seised subsequently. The jurisdiction of the court
first seised is recognized by the Lugano Conven-
tion through the conjunction of Articles 21 and 57
with the latter recognizing the jurisdiction of the
court first seised on the basis of a special conven-
tion.
84. For the purposes of the Lugano Convention, Com-
munity acts are to be treated in the same way as
special conventions. Reference should be made
here to the comments on Protocol 3.
TITLE VIII
FINAL PROVISIONS
(Articles 60 to 68)
(a)  Introductory remarks
85. Although final provisions are usually fairly stan-
dard, those in the present Convention are some-
what different and therefore require quite detailed
comment. This is a Convention which first and
foremost requires the Contracting States to have
extremely similar thinking on constitutional and
economic matters (see Chapter 1.2, point 3). More-
over, the Convention was negotiated between
States all of which belong to European organiza-
tions, either the European Communities or EFT 
The drafters of the Convention had to deal with
several questions. The first was the general one of
deciding which States could become parties to the
Convention. Other more specific questions were:
What was the position of those States which, after
the opening of the Convention for signature
became members either of the European Commu-
nities or EFT A?
What was the position of third States, i.e. countries
which did not belong to either of these two organi-
zations but wished to become parties to the Con-
vention?
What was the territorial application of the Conven-
tion?
What, finally, was the position if one of the territo-
ries for whose international relations a Contracting
State was responsible were to become indepen-
dent?
Each of these questions was examined in detail
and a series of solutions was found (1).
(b)  Article 60  States which may become parties to
the Convention
86.  Article 60  deals with this question, while Articles 61
and 62 define the relevant procedures involving
either signature and ratification (Article 61) or
accession (Article 62).
The following may in any case become parties to
the Convention:
I. States which, at the date of the opening of the
Convention for signature, are members either
of the European Communites or of EFT A;
States which, after that date, become members
of one or other of the two organizations. In
view of the origins of the Convention, this
solution was virtually self-evident since neither
of the two organizations could remain fixed in
time;
3. third States. This was undoubtedly the most
delicate question. There are, in addition to
Member States of the two organizations, States
which share the same fundamental conceptions
even though they are not European. As 
shall see in the comments on Article 62, provi-
sion has b~en made for fairly strict conditions
for the accession of such States to the Conven-
tion. In brief, although the Convention reflects
a desire for openess, its approach is clearly a
cautious one.
(c)  Article  61  Signature. ratification and entry
into force
87. According to Article 61, the Lugano Convention
shall be opened for signature by those States which
were members of one or other of the two organiza-
tions on the date  16 September 1988 
which it was opened for signature.
This was agreed because it was at the diplomatic
conference that the final text was drawn up and
adopted by the persons empowered to do so by
their States.
On that date, the Convention was signed by 10
States: for the Community Member States: Bel-
gium, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and
Portugal, and for the EFT A Member States: Ice-
land, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. The Con-
vention was subsequently signed by Finland on
30 November 1988 and by the Netherlands on
7 February 1989.
The Convention may be signed at any subsequent
time by the other six States (Federal Republic of
Germany, Spain, France, Ireland and the United
Kingdom on the one hand and Austria on the
other).
88. Pursuant to Article 61 (3), the Convention shall
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Community Member State and one Member State
of EFT A.
Since this is a multilateral Convention, such a
method of entry into force might seem somewhat
surprISIng.
The intention was deliberately to speed up entry
into force of the Lugano Convention. For persons
domiciled in a Member State of EFT A, the Con-
vention offers a number of guarantees when they
are sued in the courts of a Community Member
State. Thus, for example, Article 4 of the Brussels
Convention will cease to apply to such persons.
Moreover, persons domiciled in a Community
Member State will not be able to be sued in the
courts of a Member State of EFT A on the basis of
exorbitant rules of jurisdiction.
Furthermore, ratification procedures can be quite
slow and this would delay the entry into force of a
multilateral Convention where a certain number of
ratifications are required.
Examples of this are the 1968 Convention, which
only entered into force in 1973, and the 1978
Accession Convention, which only entered into
force between the six original Member States and
Denmark on 1 October 1986, the United Kingdom
on I January 1987 and Ireland on I June 1988. The
Convention on the accession of Greece of 25 Octo-
ber 1982 entered into force on 1 April 1989 with
regard to Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg and the Netherlands and on 1 October
1989 with regard to the United Kingdom.
In brief, it is sufficient therefore for one Com-
munity Member State and one EFT A Member
State to ratify the Lugano Convention in order to
bring it into force between those two States as from
the first day of the third month following the
deposit of the second instrument of ratification.
(d)  Articles  62  and  63  Accession
New Member States
89. Those States which, after the opening of the Con-
vention for signature, become members of either
the Communities or EFTA may accede to the Con-
vention.
Under Article 62 (4), a Contracting State may, how-
ever, consider that it is not bound by such an acces-
SIOn.
This clause was adopted in view of the fact that a
Member State of one of the two organizations has
no say in the accession of new States to the other
organization and, for reasons of its own, might feel
it cannot have ties with that new State which are as
close as those created by the Lugano Convention.
This is a safeguard clause which also applies to
third States.
Third States
90. A cautious attitude to such States is reflected in
specific conditions.
Firstly, their wish to accede to the Lugano Conven-
tion must be 'sponsored' by a Contracting State
i.e. a State which has either ratified the Convention
or acceded to it, which will inform the depositary
State of the third State s intention.
Secondly, the third State will have to inform the
depositary State of the contents of any declarations
it intends to make in order to apply the Convention
and of any details it would like to furnish in order
to apply Protocol No 1, and the depositary State
will then communicate that information to the
other signatory States and States which have
acceded. Negotiations may be held on this subject:
they may not, in any circumstances, call into ques-
tion the provisions of the Lugano Convention
itself. The device envisaged therefore differs from
that in Article 63 of the Brussels Convention
which stipulates that a new Member State of the
European Economic Community may ask for
necessary adjustments' to be the subject of a
special convention. This procedure, which was fol-
lowed notably when drawing up the 1978 Acces-
sion Convention, is not therefore applicable in the
present case.
Thirdly, the States referred to in Article 60 (a) and
(b) must, when they have thus been informed of the
declarations and details envisaged by the State
applying for accession decide unanimously
whether that State should be invited to accede.
The States referred to in Article 60 (a) and (b) are
either those States which were members of one or
other of the two organizations on the date on
which the Convention was opened for signature
e. 16 September 1988, or States which became
members of one or other of the two organizations
after that date. The agreement of any third States
which have acceded to the Convention is not there-
fore required. This was agreed because the Conven-
tion is essentially a Convention between Com-
munity and EFT A Member States and conse-
quently it did not seem advisable to give a third
State which has become a party to the Convention28. Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 189/85
the right to veto the accession of another third
State.
Fourthly, once the decision has been taken to look
at the application of a third State, negotiations can
be started, either at that State s request or at the
request of other States concerned, regarding the
details it intends to furnish for the purposes of Pro-
tocol No 
Finally, it should be noted that a last safeguard
clause allows any Contracting State (pursuant to
paragraph 4) to refuse application of the Conven-
tion in its relations with a third State which has
acceded to the Convention. This system, which is
based on various Conventions drawn up pursuant
to The Hague Conference on Private International
Law, takes account of the (possibly political) prob-
lems which might arise between a Contracting
State and a third State.
(e)  Territorial application
91. Article 60 of the 1968 Convention and Article 27 of
the 1978 Convention deal with the territorial appli-
cation of those Conventions, limiting it to the
European territory of the Contracting States, sub-
ject to clearly defined exceptions.
92. In the negotiations leading up to the Lugano Con-
vention it was found that application of the Con-
vention to non-European territories forming an
integral part of the national territory of Contracting
States or for whose international relations the latter
assume responsibility needed to be envisaged on a
broader basis. A number of these territories are fre-
quently important financial centres having close
relations with Contracting States. Given the speed
with which means of communication are develop-
ing, assets could be transferred to such territories
and if the Convention could not be applied to
them, this would create a situation which would
defeat the desired aim, since judgments given in a
State which was party to the Convention could not
be enforced in such territories under these provi-
SIOns.
93. It was agreed at the diplomatic conference that it
would be better if, like many other international
conventions, the Convention contained no provi-
sion on territorial application. The limitation to
European territories laid down in principle in the
1968 and 1978 Conventions is thus not included in
the Lugano Convention.
94. However, it was clear from the negotiations that in
the absence of any specific clause the Lugano Con-
vention applies automatically to:
the entire territory of the Kingdom of Spain
the entire territory of the Portuguese Republic
in the case of France: all territories which are
an integral part of the French Republic (see
Article 71  et seq.  of the Constitution), includ-
ing therefore the French Overseas Departments
(Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guiana, Reunion),
the Overseas Territories (Polynesia, New Cale-
donia, Southern and Antartic Territories) and
the individual territorial collectivities (Saint
Pierre and Miquelon, Mayotte).
95. The situation is slightly different where Denmark
and the Netherlands are concerned.
Denmark:
With a view to ratification of the Lugano Conven-
tion, Denmark made known its wish to reserve the
right to extend the scope of the Convention at a
later stage to the Faroe Islands and Greenland
which are part of the Kingdom of Denmark but
enjoy autonomy in their internal affairs (Law No
137 of 23 March 1948 for the Faroe Islands and No
577 of 29 November 1978 for Greenland) and
which must be consulted on draft laws affecting
their territories. In the light of the outcome of such
consultations, Denmark will be able to state, in a
declaration to be addressed at any time to the
depositary State, what the situation is with respect
to the application of the Convention to these terri-
tories.
The Netherlands:
Since 1 January 1986, the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands consists of three countries, namely: the N eth-
erlands, the Netherlands Antilles (the islands of
Bonaire, Cura~ao, Sint Maarten (Netherlands part
of the island), Sint Eustatius and Saba) and Aruba.
Following the necessary consultations, the N ether-
lands, just like Denmark in the case of the Faroe
Islands and Greenland, will be able to state in a
declaration which may be addressed at any time to
the depositary State, what the situation is with res-
pect to the application of the Convention to the
Netherlands Antilles and to Aruba.
96. On the other hand, other Contracting States (the
United Kingdom and Portugal in the case of
Macao and Timor-Leste) comprise entities which
are separate from the metropolitan territory. Inter-
national agreements cannot be concluded on
behalf of these entities other than by the United
Kingdom and Portugal.
United Kingdom:
During the negotiations, the United Kingdom, like
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pean territories for whose international re~ations it
is responsible (8). For the European territories, see
Schlosser report, paragraph 252.
This list of non-European territories is included in
the acts of the diplomatic conference. The United
Kingdom also gave an indication of the territories
to which it might consider making the Convention
actually apply. It was agreed that provision of such
information did not imply any binding obligation
that other extensions could not be made, but the
information provided was intended to assist the
other States in assessing the practical consequences
for them of an extension of the application of the
Convention.
For this purpose, the United Kingdom indicated
that, of its non-European territories, Anguilla, Ber-
muda, British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, Turks
and Caicos Islands and Hong Kong were ones to
which there might be a real prospect of the Con-
vention being extended.
Portugal:
The question of extending the Convention to
Macao and Timor- Leste has not yet been settled.
(f)  Territories which become independent
97. The question of what would happen regarding
application of the Lugano Convention to territories
gaining independence was also considered.
The Convention contains no provisions on this
subject. Such a clause is not usual in international
Conventions. On the other hand, this is a familiar
problem in public international law and it is gener-
ally accepted that, if a country gains independence
any Contracting State is free to decide whether or
not it is bound by the Convention in question in
respect of the new State and vice versa (on this
point, see Schlosser report, paragraph 254).
In any event, a State which has become indepen-
dent may, if it wishes to become a party to the
Lugano Convention make use of the accession
procedure provided for third States in Article 62 of
the Lugano Convention (see point 90).
CHAPTER IV
PROTOCOLS
98. Under Article 65, the three supplementary Proto-
cols form an integral part of the Convention.
PROTOCOL I ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS OF
JURISDICTION, PROCEDURE AND
ENFORCEMENT
Introductory remarks
99. This Protocol corresponds to the Protocol
annexed to the Brussels Convention. The provi-
sions contained in Articles I, II, III and Vd of
that Protocol are reproduced unmodified in Pro-
tocol I to the Lugano Convention. The provisions
contained in Article Vc of the Protocol annexed
to the Brussels Convention are not reproduced in
this Protocol. Those provisions were inserted into
the Protocol annexed to the Brussels Convention
only to make it clear that the concept of 'resid-
ence' in the English text of the Convention for the
European patent for the common market, signed
at Luxembourg on 15 December 1975, should be
deemed to have the same scope as the concept of
domicile' in the Brussels Convention. Such prov-
IslOns were, however, redundant in the Lugano
Convention. The other provisions of the Protocol
annexed to the Brussels Convention are reprod-
uced in this Protocol with minor amendments
most of which are due to the law in force in var-
ious EFT A Member States. Furthermore, the Pro-
tocol contains two Articles (Ia and Ib) which have
no equivalent in the Protocol annexed to the
Brussels Convention.
Article Ia  Swiss reservation
100. This Article contains a reservation asked for by
Switzerland. It provides that Switzerland may
declare, at the time of depositing its instrument of
ratification, that a judgment given in another
Contracting State shall neither be recognized nor
enforced in Switzerland if the jurisdiction of the
court which has given the judgment is based only
on Article 5 (1) (place of performance of contract)
of the Lugano Convention and if certain other
conditions are met. As this head of jurisdiction is
regarded by many States as the most commer-28. 7. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 189/87
cially significant of all the special bases of juris-
diction in the Lugano Convention, the terms of
this part of Protocol No I were the subject of
close discussion.
For Switzerland the need for a reservation arose
from the provisions of Article 59 of the Swiss
Federal Constitution (9) which reserves the right
for a person of S)Viss domicile, whatever his
nationality, to be sued over a contract in the
courts of his domicile. Whilst some exceptions
existed to this general principle, it became clear
that a provision such as Article 5 (1) of the Con-
vention could involve a conflict with the constitu-
tional rule in Switzerland and make Swiss partici-
pation in the Convention impossible. The com-
promise reached limits the effect of the reserva-
tion to the minimum necessary.
101. In the first place, any reservation will only apply
if the defendant was domiciled in Switzerland at
the time of the introduction of the proceedings. In
the application of the reservation the question of
domicile will be determined and acknowledged in
accordance with the general principles and rules
of the Convention. However, a company or other
legal person is considered to be domiciled in
Switzerland only if it has its registered seat and
the effective centre of activities in Switzerland.
The reservation will thus not apply if the effective
centre of activities of a company or other legal
person is outside Switzerland even if the com-
pany or other legal person has its registered seat
in Switzerland. Furthermore, the reservation will
never apply unless the company or legal person
concerned has its registered seat in Switzerland.
Secondly, recognition and enforcement may only
be refused under the reservation if the jurisdiction
of the court which has given the judgment was
based solely on Article 5 (1). If, for example, a
defendant domiciled in Switzerland were to sub-
mit to the jurisdiction in the other Contracting
State the reservation would not apply, because in
that event jurisdiction would not have been based
solely on Article 5 (I), but also on Article 18.
Equally, the reservation will not apply if the jur-
isdiction of the original court is based on 
agreement to confer jurisdiction over contractual
disputes, since in that case jurisdiction would
have been derived from Article 17.
Thirdly, the reservation will not apply unless the
defendant raises an objection to the recognition
and enforcement of the judgment in Switzerland.
The objection must be raised in good faith. It was
explained by the Swiss delegation that it was
entirely possible under Swiss law for the defen-
dant to waive the protection available under
Article 59 of the Constitution and that this waiver
could validly be made at any time. Thus this
waiver can be made even before Switzerland has
made any declaration. This is reflected' in the text
of the Article by the words ' the declaration  fore-
seen  under this paragraph'. It will therefore 
possible for persons contracting with persons
enjoying Swiss domicile to stipulate a waiver 
the protection provided for in Article 59 of the
Swiss Federal Constitution which would other-
wise be available. An agreement between the par-
ties on the waiver of such protection could be
made orally or in writing as long as there is suffi-
cient proof that the waiver has been made. In the
event that such an agreement has been made, or if
the Swiss court is otherwise satisfied as a matter
of fact that the defendant has waived his rights
then recognition and enforcement will not be
refused in Switzerland even if a reservation has
been made.
Fourthly, the reservation will not apply to con-
tracts in respect of which, at the time recognition
and enforcement is sought, a derogation has been
granted from Article 59 of the Swiss Federal Con-
stitution. The Swiss Government is obliged to
communicate such derogations to the signatory
States and the acceding States.
Fifthly, the Swiss delegation has declared that a
reservation envisaged in this Article will not
apply to contracts of employment. Thus Switzer-
land will in no event refuse the recognition or
enforcement of a judgment given in a matter
relating to an individual contract of employment
on the ground that the jurisdiction of the court
which has given the judgment is based only on
the second part of Article 5 (I) of the Convention.
Finally, any declaration made by Switzerland
under this Article is to expire on a fixed date, i.
on 31 December 1999. If, by that time, the Swiss
Federal Constitution has not been amended so as
to remove the constitutional difficulty, one possi-
bility would be for Switzerland to consider de-
nouncing the Convention, and become a party to
it again when the constitutional difficulty has
been removed.
102. If Switzerland makes the reservation provided for
in this Article it will be open to other Contracting
States to reciprocate the effect of that reservation
by refusing to enforce judgments originating in
Switzerland if the jurisdiction of the Swiss court is
based solely on Article 5 (1) of the Convention
and if conditions corresponding to those men-
tioned in Article la of the Protocol are fulfilled.No. C 189/88 Official Journal of the European Communities 28.
By reason of the difference in constitutional sys-
tems, a reciprocity clause was not inserted in the
Protocol. The result is that the matter of reciproc-
ity will be left to the normal rules of public inter-
national law. In view of the fact that such rules
may be incorporated differently into national law
solutions to the question of reciprocity may vary
from country to country.
In countries applying the 'dualist' system the
question of reciprocity will be dealt with at a leg-
islative level, thus settling the question of reci-
procity in a general manner. In those countries
where the 'monist' system exists it is for the courts
or other authorities to decide on the question of
reciprocity. For instance in France, where the
monist' system exists , a treaty, according to the
French constitution, has a higher level than law
provided that the treaty is applied in a reciprocal
manner. If the question of whether a treaty is
applied in a reciprocal manner is raised before a
court and the answer is not clear, the judge will
submit the question to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs which is competent for the interpretation
of treaties.
As far as the aspect of application of Article 7 of
the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community is concerned (non-discrimination on
grounds of. nationality), the judge in a Com-
munity Member State can, if the question arises
before him, submit it to the Court of Justice of the
European Communities for a preliminary ruling
under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty.
From the discussions it is apparent that certain
States will not reciprocate.
Article Ib  Reservation on tenancies
103. This Article provides that any Contracting State
may, by a declaration made at the time of signing
or deposit of its instrument of ratification or
accession, reserve the right not to recognize and
enforce judgments given in other Contracting
States if the jurisdiction of the court of origin is
based, pursuant to Article 16 (1) (b), exclusively
on the domicile of the defendant in the State of
OrIgIn.
This provision has been commented on above
(see point 53).
Article IV  Judicial and extra-judicial docu-
ments
104. This Article reproduces Article IV of the Protocol
annexed to 'the Brussels Convention. The declara-
tion referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article will
however, not be made to the Secretary-General of
the Council of the European Communities but to
the depositary of the Lugano Convention.
Article V  Actions on a warranty or guaran-
tee
105. Under Austrian, Spanish and Swiss law, as under
German law, the function performed by an action
on a warranty or guarantee or any other third
party proceedings is fulfilled by means of third-
party notices. A rule analogous to that contained
in Article V of the Protocol annexed to the Brus-
sels Convention (see Jenard report, page 27, com-
ments on Article 6 (2)) has accordingly been
applied to Austria, Spain and Switzerland in this
Article. Unlike the case of Austria, the Federal
Republic of Germany and Spain, it has not been
possible to refer to a single legislative source in
Swiss law. Provisions on third-party notices are to
be found both in the federal law of civil proce-
dure and in the 26 cantonal codes of civil proce-
dure.
Third party intervention in proceedings is not
governed by explicit rules in the Spanish legal
system and the want of proper procedures is the
source of procedural uncertainty. This legal hiatus
has been severely citicized in the works of legal
experts, who have recommended that it be reme-
died in the near future. However, this has not
prevented acceptance of third party proceedings
in some fields of jurisprudence or in civil laws
governing certain specific cases, e.g. Article 124
(3) of Law No 11 of 20 March 1986 on patents
and Article 1482 (*) of the Civil Code, regarding
eviction. Generally speaking, it is the latter rule
which is applicable in cases of non-voluntary
third party proceedings; in the negotiations
between the Member States of the European
Communities and those of the European Free
Trade Association, it was therefore judged advisa-
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Article 1482 is referred to, albeit indirectly, in
Article 638 (gift), 1145 (joint and several obliga-
tions), 1529 (assignment of claims), 1540
(exchange), 1553 (tenancy), 1681 (obligations of
partners), 1830 (surety), 1831 (co-surety), etc. of
the Civil Code.
Article Va  Jurisdiction of administrative
authorities
106. In Iceland and Norway administrative authorities
are, as in Denmark, competent in matters relating
to maintenance. Thus Iceland and Norway have
been included in this Article in addition to Den-
mark.
107. In Finland, for historical reasons the 'ulosoton-
haltijal overexekutor' (regional chief enforcement
authority) is competent for protective measures
referred to in Article 24 of the Lugano Conven-
tion. Furthermore, a documentary procedure for
collecting debts based on a promissory note or a
similar document, as well as some other summary
proceedings e.g. eviction, take place before that
authority. These proceedings are an optional
alternative to court proceedings. The 'ulosoton-
haltijal overexekutor' is clearly not a court but an
administrative authority, which in the aforemen-
tioned cases plays a judicial role. The abolition of
the 'ulosotonhaltija/ overexekutor' is envisaged
and its functions as far as civil and commercial
matters are concerned will be transferred to the
courts.
In order to avoid any imbalance a second para-
graph has been inserted in this Article according
to which the expression ' court' in civil and com-
mercial matters includes the Finnish 'ulosoton-
haltija/ overexekutor
Article Vb  Dispute between the master and
a member of a ship s crew
108. Following specific requests from the Icelandic
Norwegian, Portuguese and Swedish delegations
Iceland, Norway, Portugal and Sweden have been
included in this Article.
Article VI  Amendment of national legisla-
tion
109. This Article reproduces Article VI of the Protocol
annexed to the Brussels Convention. The com-
munication provided for in this Article will, how-
ever, not be made to the Secretary-General of the
Council of the European Communities but to the
depositary of the Lugano Convention.
PROTOCOL 2 ON THE UNIFORM
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVENTION
Introductory remarks
110. Without uniform interpretation, the unifying force
of the Lugano Convention would be considerably
reduced. In addition, a considerable number, if
not the majority, of its provisions are reproduced
from the Brussels Convention, which posed a fur-
ther problem. As we know, in order to avoid such
differences of interpretation, the Community
Member States concluded a Protocol on 3 June
1971 giving jurisdiction to the Court of Justice of
the European Communities to rule on the inter-
pretation of the Brussels Convention. When
applying that Convention, the courts of the Com-
munity Member States must comply with the
interpretation given by the Court of Justice.
However, the Court of Justice could not 
assigned jurisdiction to interpret the Lugano Con-
vention which is not a source of Community law.
Furthermore, the EFT A Member States could not
have accepted a solution according to which an
institution of the Communities would, as a court
of last resort, rule on the Lugano Convention.
Nor was it conceivable to assign such jurisdiction
to any other international court or to create a new
court since inter alia the Court of Justice of the
European Communities already had jurisdiction
under the 1971 Protocol to rule on the interpreta-
tion of the Brussels Convention and conflicts of
jurisdiction between international courts had at
all events to be avoided.
111. The solution adopted to resolve this comewhat
complex situation (i.e. ensuring uniform interpre-
tation of the Lugano Convention while taking
account of the powers of the Court of Justice of
the European Communities as regards the inter-
pretation of the Brussels Convention, many of the
provisions of which were reproduced in the
Lugano Convention) is based on the principle of
consultation and not on judicial hierarchy.
It was thus agreed that judgments delivered pur-
suant to the Lugano Convention or the Brussels
Convention are to be communicated through a
central body to each signatory State and acceding
State and that meetings of representatives
appointed by each such State are to be convened
to exchange views on the functioning of the Con-
vention. As regards legal technique it was
decided that the provisions aiming at uniform
interpretation should be included in a ProtocolNo. C 189/90 Official Journal of the European Communities 28. 7. 90
annexed to the Convention, the provisions of
which would form an integral part thereof. It was
furthermore agreed that two Declarations would
be annexed to the Protocol. One of these Declara-
tions was to be signed by the representatives of
the Governments of the States signatories to the
Lugano Convention which were members of the
European Communities and the other by the
representatives of the Governments of the States
signatories to the Lugano Convention which were
members of EFT A.
Preamble
112. The  first  recital in the preamble makes reference
to Article 65 of the Lugano Convention. Accord-
ing to this Article, a Protocol 2 on the uniform
interpretation of the Convention by the courts
will form an integral part of the Convention.
The  second  recital refers to the substantial link
between the Lugano Convention and the Brussels
Convention.
As has already been mentioned, the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Communities has, under the
Protocol of 3 June 1971, been entrusted with jur-
isdiction to give rulings on the interpretation of
the provisions of the Brussels Convention. A
starting point for the negotiations for the conclu-
sion of the Lugano Convention was that those
provisions of the Brussels Convention which were
to be substantially reproduced in the Lugano
Convention should be understood in the light of
these rulings given up to the date of opening for
signature of the latter Convention. The working
party which drafted the Convention was aware of
all those rulings delivered up to that date. The
intention was to arrive at as uniform as possible
an interpretation where the provisions in question
were identical in the two Conventions. On the
other hand, insofar as a provision of the Brussels
Convention as interpreted by the Court of Justice
of the European Communities, e.g. Article 16 (I),
was found not to be acceptable, it was not reprod-
uced unmodified in the Convention (for judg-
ments of the Court of Justice, see Chapter VI).
The  third. fourth  and  fifth  recitals were included
in the Preamble in order to stress the relevance of
the rulings on the interpretation of the Brussels
Co'nvention given by the Court of Justice of the
European Communities up to the time of the sig-
nature of the Lugano Convention.
The  sixth  recital confirms the wish of the Con-
tracting States to prevent, in full deference to the
independence of the courts, divergent interpreta-
tions.
Article 1
113. This Article relates only to decisions concerning
provisions of the Lugano Convention. It provides
that the courts of each Contracting Party shall
when applying and interpreting that Convention
pay due account to the principles laid down by
any  relevant decision  delivered by courts of the
other Contracting Parties concerning provisions
of the Lugano Convention. The expression 'any
relevant decision' means in  this Article those
decisions delivered by courts of the Contracting
Parties which according to Article 2 (I), first
indent, have been transmitted to a central body,
e. judgments delivered by courts of last instance
and other judgments of particular importance
which have become final.
114. This Article does not  explicitly  refer to decisions
concerning the application and interpretation of
those provisions of the Brussels Convention
which are substantially reproduced in the Lugano
Convention.
It must be remembered that the courts of the
Community Member States are the only courts
required to apply the Brussels Convention and
that when they interpret provisions of that Con-
vention, they must respect the judgments of the
Court of Justice. The Community Member States
were, however, not in a position to commit the
Court of Justice, a separate institution, to pay due
regard to judgments of national courts in EFT 
Member States. For their part, the representatives
of the EFT A Member States thought that it would
not be entirely fair to include a provision in the
Protocol which expressly stipulated that the
courts of these States had to take account not
only of the decisions given by the courts of the
other Contracting States but also of the judg-
ments of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, while the latter would not be sub-
ject to any undertaking as regards the interpreta-
tion of the provisions of the Brussels Convention
which were reproduced in the Lugano Conven-
tion.
115. It was, however, recognized that the courts of the
Community Member States, when interpreting
provisions of the Lugano Convention which are
reproduced from the Brussels Convention, would
understand those provisions in the same way as
the identical provisions of the Brussels Conven-
tion and in accordance with the interpretations
given in the rulings of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities. It was therefore essen-
tial, in order to ensure as uniform an interpreta-
tion as possible of the Lugano Convention, that
the courts of the EFT A Member States apply it in
the same way as the courts of the Community
Member States. But it was equally necessary for
the Court of Justice, when interpreting provisions
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duced in the Lugano Convention to pay due
account in particular to the case law of the courts
of the 'EFT A Member States.
116. In order to achieve this twofold objective two
Declarations accompany the Convention. In one
of them the representatives of the Governments of
the States signatories to the Lugano Convention
which are members of the Communities declare
that they consider as appropriate that the Court of
Justice, when interpreting the Brussels Conven-
tion, pay due account to the rulings contained in
the case law of the Lugano Convention. In the
other, the representatives of the EFT A States
declare that they consider as appropriate that
their courts, when interpreting the Lugano Con-
vention, pay due account to the rulings contained
in the case law of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities and of the courts of the
Member States of the European Communities in
respect of provisions of the Brussels Convention
which are substantially reproduced in the Lugano
Convention.
At the request of the representatives of the EFT A
States, a list and the contents of the judgments
delivered by the Court of Justice when interpret-
ing the 1968 Convention is given in this report
(see Chapter VI).
Article 2
117. As we have already said, it was agreed that a uni-
form interpretation of the common provisions of
the Lugano and Brussels Conventions would be
achieved by means of information and consul-
tation. According to the first paragraph of this
Article the Contracting States agree to set up 
system of exchange of information concerning
judgments delivered pursuant to the Lugano Con-
vention as well as  relevant  judgments under the
Brussels Convention. The expression 'relevant
judgments' means, in  this context, those judg-
ments delivered pursuant to the Brussels Conven-
tion which are relevant for the interpretation of
the Lugano Convention as well.
This system of exchange of information com-
pnses :
transmission to a central body by the compe-
tent national authorities of judgments
delivered pursuant to the Lugano Convention
or the Brussels Convention
classification of these judgments by the cen-
tral body including, as far as necessary, the
drawing up and publication of translations
and abstracts
communication by the central body of the rel-
evant documents to the competent national
authorities of all signatories and acceding
States to the Lugano Convention and to the
Commission of the European Communities.
The abovementioned central body will, according
to paragraph 2 of this Article, be the Registrar of
the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties. The Registrar has signified his agreement to
this, provided that the detailed arrangements for
the system of exchange of information, and in
particular the question of the translation of judg-
ments not drawn up in an official language of the
Communities, are worked out with the Court after
the Diplomatic Conference and that the depart-
ment of the Court receive the necessary aid and
budgetary support. The competent national auth-
orities referred to in the first and third indent of
paragraph I of this Article are to be designated by
each Member State concerned.
This system of exchange of information will
however, not include every judgment delivered by
a national court pursuant to the Lugano Conven-
tion or every relevant judgment delivered pur-
suant to the Brussels Convention. For the pur-
poses of the objective which the Protocol is aim-
ing at it will suffice that judgments delivered by
courts of last instance and the Court of Justice as
well as judgments of other courts which are of
particular importance and have become final are
transmitted to the central body referred to in this
Article (paragraph 1 first indent). Only those
judgments will thus be classified by the central
body and communicated pursuant to the third
indent of paragraph I of this Article.
To the extent that the communication of docu-
mentation implies publication of translations and
abstracts by the central body, it was agreed that
such publication, in the interests of economy,
could take a simplified form.
Article 3
118. In order to ensure a uniform interpretation of the
common provisions of the Lugano and Brussels
Conventions, it was deemed necessary that repre-
sentatives appointed by each signatory or acced-
ing State meet to exchange views on the function-
ing of the Lugano Convention. To this end
Article 3 provides that a Standing Committe com-
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tory or acceding State shall be set up. This Stand-
ing Committee is not intended to be a bureau-
cratic body but rather a forum where national
experts could exchange their views on the func-
tioning of the Convention and in particular on
the case law as it develops in the various Con-
tracting States, with the aim of fostering in that
manner, as far as possible, uniformity in the inter~
pretation of the Convention. No regular meetings
of the Committee are provided for in the Proto-
col. Meetings of the Committee will, according to
Article 4 (I) of the Protocol, be convened only at
the request of a Contracting Party.
In this context it deserves to be emphasized that
not only States which have already become par-
ties to the Convention (either by ratifying it or by
acceding to it), but also States which have signed
the Convention but not yet become parties to it
may appoint their representatives as members of
the Standing Committee. This solution was
adopted since a distinction between signatory and
Contracting States would suggest that certain
States might sign the Lugano Convention without
any intention of ratifying it.
Divergent views were expressed as to whether the
Standing Committee should be composed 
judges or civil servants. It was decided that it
would be for each State to appoint its representa-
tives on the Committee. Thus, it may well be that
certain States will appoint judges whereas other
States may appoint civil servants or others. It goes
without saying that each State is free to decide
how and for which period of time anyone is
appointed to represent it on the Committee.
Because of the links between the Lugano Con-
vention and the Brussels Convention, paragraph 3
of this Article provides that representatives of the
European Communities (i.e. of the Commission
the Court of Justice and the General Secretariat of
the Council) and of EFT A may attend the meet-
ings of the Committee as observers.
If necessary, it will be for the Committee to estab-
lish its own rules of procedure.
Article 4
119. The provisions of paragraph I of this Article con-
cern the convocation and the tasks of the Stand-
ing Committee. As already mentioned, the meet-
ings of the Committee will be convened at the
request of a Contracting Party for the purpose of
exchanging views on the functioning of the Con-
vention. In this context it deserves to be emphas-
ized that a meeting of the Committee cannot be
convened at the request of a State which has only
signed the Convention but not yet become a party
to it, even though the Committee, according to
Article 3 (2), will be composed of representatives
appointed by each signatory State or acceding
State. The task of convening the Committee has
been entrusted to the depositary of the Conven-
tion.
There are no limitations as to the questions relat-
ing to the functioning of the Convention which
oblige the depositary to convene meetings of the
Committee at the request of a Contracting Party.
In view of the purpose of the Protocol, Article 4
provides that meetings of the Committee will be
convened for the purpose of exchanging views in
particular on the development of the case law as
communicated under the first indent of Article 2
(I). The purpose of this provision is not, however
to invest the Committee with the role of a higher
body which would assess the judgments given by
national courts. It is rather a body, which, by
examining such judgments, would identify div-
ergences of interpretation and, as far as possible
foster uniformity in the interpretation of the Con-
vention.
Article 57 (I) of the Convention provides that it
will not affect any conventions to which the Con-
tracting States are or will be parties and which, in
relation to particular matters, govern jurisdiction
or the recognition or enforcement of judgments.
According to Protocol No 3, provisions which
govern jurisdiction or the recognition or enforce-
ment of judgments and which are or will be con-
tained in acts of the institutions of the European
Communities will be treated in the same way as
conventions referred to in Article 57 (1).
Provisions which in relation to particular matters
govern jurisdiction may, irrespective of whether
such provisions are contained in' a convention or
in a Community act, amount to a change of the
rules of jurisdiction contained in the Convention
without the agreement of all the Contracting Par-
ties. Therefore paragraph I of this Article further
provides that meetings of the Committee will be
convened for exchanging views on the applica-
tion of Article 57 of the Convention. Paragraph 2
of Protocol No 3 on Community acts makes prov-
ision for a similar procedure. Thus the Committee
will provide a forum where views can be
exchanged  inter alia  on the provisions governing
jurisdiction in particular matters adopted or
envisaged in Community acts.
In the light of these exchanges of views it may
appear that an amendment of the Convention
would be appropriate. This may be the case if the
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municated under Article 2, were to identify div-
ergences of interpretation arising from a lack 
clarity in one or more of the provisions of the
Convention. Therefore, paragraph 2 of the Article
provides that the Committee may also examine
the appropriateness of starting on particular to-
pics a revision of the Convention and make
recommendations.
This power of the Committee should not be con-
fused with the right for any Contracting State
under Article 66 of the Convention to request the
revision of the Convention. The powers and pro-
cedures in that Article differ radically from those
provided for in Article 4 (2) of the Protocol. 
recommendation made by the Committee is thus
not to be assimilated with a request by a Con-
tracting State under Article 67 of the Convention
for a revision conference. Only a Contracting
State but not the Committee may request the
depositary of the Convention to convene a revi-
sion conference. Neither is a recommendation of
the Committee a prerequisite for the right of a
Contracting State to request the revision of the
Convention.
. PROTOCOL 3 ON THE APPLICATION OF
ARTICLE 57
120. This Protocol is in response to the problems
which might arise from any provisions on juris-
diction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments appearing in Community acts.
Concern of the States party to the Lugano
Convention
121. The entirely justified concern of both Community
and EFT A Member States has been vigorously
expressed in regard to Community acts. Why is
this?
(a) For the Community Member States, it 
because they have, in a manner of speaking, a
dual personality. They are sovereign States.
But they are also members of the Communi-
ties and are thus bound, by virtue of this lat-
ter point, to comply with the obligations to
which they have subscribed under the Trea-
ties establishing the European Communities
(ECSC EEC and Euratom). Under those
Treaties, it is the Council which is competent
to adopt Regulations and Directives which in
specific matters may possibly concern juris-
diction and the recognition and enforcement
of judgments, according to the requirements
of those Communities (10
The concern of these States was threefold:
the need to comply with the obligations
they have entered into by becoming party
to the Treaties establishing the Communi-
ties
the need to avoid hampering any
development taking place in the context
of the Treaties and relating to the powers
of the Community institutions
the need to respect the commitments
entered into by the Lugano Convention
vis-iI-vis  the EFT A Member States.
(b) For the EFT A Member States, because they
feared that the guarantees offered them by the
Lugano Convention regarding jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments could, in certain areas, be practically
wiped out by a Community act. In particular
the representatives of the EFT A Member
States voiced the fear that the protection
guaranteed by the Lugano Convention, parti-
cularly by Article 3, to defendants domiciled
in an EFT A Member State might be under-
mined by a Community act. Such defendants
might thus be treated differently from defen-
dants domiciled in a Community Member
State, or even be put in the same situation as
defendants domiciled in third States. For
example, for the representatives of these
States it was inconceivable to accept that it
should be possible for a person domiciled in
the territory of an EFT A Member State (e.
Norway) to be required to appear before the
courts of a Member State of the Communities
(such as France) on the basis of a Community
act which they had played no part in drawing
up and on the basis of a criterion of jurisdic-
tion not provided for in the Lugano Conven-
tion. In any event, for these States, it was
unacceptable that it should be possible for a
judgment delivered on the basis of such a rule
of jurisdiction to be recognized and enforced
in their territory under the Lugano Conven-
tion. These fears would seem to be as well-
founded as those of the Member States of the
Communities.
In short, for the EFT A Member States, the
inclusion of rules of jurisdiction and of recog-
nition and enforcement of judgments in
Community acts could, in the absence of any
correcting mechanism be regarded 
empowering the Community Member States
to amend the Lugano Convention unilater-
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Response to this concern
122. The question for the authors of the Convention
was how to respond to these various concerns, all
equally justified, and to work out a solution that
could be accepted by all the Contracting Parties.
We shall try and answer two questions, the prob-
lem having been resolved: Why was it possible to
solve the problem? How was it solved?
It was possible to respond to this concern because
there existed on both sides a conviction or, one
might prefer to say, a deep awareness that despite
its difficulties the problem posed could and had
to be resolved, in accordance with the principles
of public international law, because of the funda-
mental objectives of the Lugano Convention , i.
the granting of guarantees to a defendant domi-
ciled in the territory of a Contracting State and
the free movement of judgments.
In addition, it emerged during the discussions
that despite its theoretical aspect the problem had
only a very relative impact in practice; thus the
Member States of the Communities stressed the
fact that in 30 years no Community act contain-
ing provisions on jurisdiction had been adopted.
It should however be noted that a draft Regula-
tion on the Community trade mark containing
such jurisdiction rules is currently in preparation.
Also, some Community Member States made it
clear that for practical reasons they were not in
favour of Community acts including provisions
relating to jurisdiction and to the recognition and
enforcement of judgments. For these States, the
issue had to be settled by the Brussels Conven-
tion, even if that meant its being revised
amended or supplemented, since for the practi-
tioner (lawyers, judges, and others) this Conven-
tion constituted a Community code which was
becoming well known. If these provisions were
scattered throughout numerous Community
instruments it would weaken the scope of this
code and make it more difficult to apply. These
States were well aware of the importance that
Community acts might have in this matter and
they considered that any resort to these instru-
ments, in the areas in question, should continue
to be entirely exceptional.
Solution adopted
123. How was the problem resolved?
The solution is to be found in Protocol 3 and in
the Declaration by the Member States of the
Communities which supplements it.
What is involved in this solution that has given
satisfaction to both sides?
Protocol 3 and the Declaration supplementing it
form a whole.
(a)  Protocol 
124.  In paragraph  , for the purposes of the Lugano
Convention, Protocol No  treats Community
acts in the same way as the conventions which
have been concluded on particular matters and
whose effect on the Lugano Convention is deter-
mined by Article 57 of the Convention (see points
79 to 83). In the view of the representatives of the
Community Member States, there is no differ-
ence, except as regards the way they were drawn
up, between these two types of instrument.
They pointed out that if the EFT A Member States
were willing to entertain the possibility for the
States party to the Lugano Convention of the
rules of that Convention being amended by con-
ventions concluded in particular areas (transport
etc.) they could also agree to the Community
amending the Convention by means of Com-
munity acts. These representatives also stressed
that to be approved a Community act required in
principle the agreement of the 12 Member States
whereas a convention on a particular matter
whose rules could depart from those of the
Lugano Convention, could be concluded between
two States only. In their view, there was accord-
ingly no substantive difference between the two
types of instrument: conventions on particular
matters and Community acts.
The representatives of the EFT A Member States
were able to accept this view only for the pur-
poses of this Convention and in conjunction with
paragraph 2 of Protocol 3 and the Declaration
supplementing it (see point 127 below). They also
said that their States had no wish to obstruct the
Communities' proper and specific demands that
they preserve a certain freedom to develop Com-
munity law.
125. What are the consequences of paragraph 1 of Pro-
tocol 3 which, for the purposes of this Conven-
tion, treats Community acts in the same way as
conventions concluded on particular matters?
It will be possible for a person domiciled in the
territory of a Contracting State (such as Switzer-
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of another Contracting State belonging to the
European Communities (such as Belgium) on the
basis of a rule of jurisdiction which is not laid
down in the Lugano Convention but results from
a Community act (just like a convention on a
particular matter).
A judgment handed down by a court in a Com-
munity Member State  which has jurisdiction
by virtue of the Community act which derogates
as regards jurisdiction, from the Lugano Conven-
tion  will be recognized and enforced in the
other Community Member States. However
recognition and enforcement may be refused
under the conditions laid down in Article 57 (4),
e. in an EFTA Member State where the person
against whom recognition or enforcement of the
decision is being sought is domiciled, unless such
recognition and enforcement are permitted under
the law of the State.
It should be noted that paragraph I of the Proto-
col refers only to Community acts and not to the
legislation of the Community Member States
where this has been harmonized pursuant to those
acts, in this case by Directives. The assimilation
of Community acts to conventions concluded on
particular matters can only refer to an act which is
equivalent to such a convention and cannot there-
fore extend to national legislation.
Moreover, if a national legislation, departing
from a Directive, were to introduce rules of juris-
diction derogating from the Lugano Convention
the situation would be different, i.e. it would be a
question of the responsibility of the State which
had taken such measures.
As explained above, the representatives of the
EFT A Member States were able to agree to Com-
munity acts being treated in the same way as con-
ventions concluded on particular matters only
subject to a Declaration by the Community Mem-
ber States that they will comply with the rules on
jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of
judgments established by the Lugano Convention
(for comments on that Declaration, see point 127
below).
126.  Paragraph  of Protocol  3 refers to the case where
notwithstanding the precautions taken, in the
view of one of the Contracting Parties, a provi-
sion of a Community act is not compatible with
the Lugano 'Convention. For example, this is the
situation that might arise if the Community act
provided for the jurisdiction of the court of the
plaintiffs domicile  vis-a-vis  a defendant who was
domiciled outside the Community and therefore
in an EFT A Member State.
Paragraph 2 has the effect of a  pactum de nego-
tiando.  If one of the Contracting Parties considers
there is incompatibility between the Community
act and the Lugano Convention, negotiations will
be initiated to amend, if necessary, the Lugano
Convention. To this end the review procedure
provided for in Article 66 of the Lugano Conven-
tion will apply without prejudice to the possibility
of a meeting of the Standing Committee set up by
Article 3 of Protocol 2 being convened to hear
this request in accordance with Article 4 of that
Protocol.
Negotiations will have to begin immediately to
establish rapidly whether or not there is any need
to amend the Lugano Convention. Paragraph 2
contains only an undertaking to contemplate an
amendment rather than actually to amend the
Convention.
Moreover, paragraph 2 of Protocol 3 does not
contain any undertaking, nor could it, to contem-
plate an amendment to a Community act. Such
negotiations would lie outside relations between
the States party to the Convention and should be
undertaken with the Community institutions, as
Community acts fall within the competence of the
latter.
It should be noted that the procedure laid down
in paragraph 2 could be instigated equally well by
a Community Member State or by an EFT A
Member State. An EFT A Member State will be
able in particular to request the amendment of the
Lugano Convention to avoid derogating measures
being taken through a Community act in respect
of persons domiciled in its territory. On the other
hand, a Community Member State could have an
interest in adapting the Lugano Convention so
that judgments delivered in its territory can be
recognized and executed in all EFT A Member
States, to which Article 57 (4) might prove an
obstacle.
(b)  The Declaration by the Governments of the
Member States of the Communities
127. Protocol 3 is accompanied by an important Dec-
laration by the Community Member States. This
unilateral Declaration represents an essential ele-
ment of the solution adopted, the other two being
the placing of Community acts on the same foot-
ing as conventions on particular matters and the
undertaking to negotiate if there is any divergence
between a Community act and the Lugano Con-
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As we have explained, the Community Member
States are caught between two stools. On the one
hand, they have to respect the institutional machi-
nery laid down by the Treaties establishing the
Communities while on the other they must res-
pect the undertakings they entered into under the
Lugano Convention in respect of the EFT A
Member States.
The Declaration is important because the Com-
munity Member States, without forgetting that
they belong to the Communities and with due res-
pect for its institutions:
defendant domiciled in a Contracting State.
The result is that when a Community act is
discussed in the Council of the Communities,
particular attention will have to be paid by
each of the Member States to the rules of the
Lugano Convention.
To sum up, the Declaration represents a moral
and political undertaking, made in good faith by
the Community Member States, to keep intact the
efforts towards unification which are being made
by the Lugano Convention.
Conclusion
(a) take into consideration the undertakings
which they have entered into with regard to
the EFT A Member States. For those States
the Lugano Convention is therefore an instru-
ment to be complied with. On their side there
is therefore what was regarded as a 'best
efforts' clause aimed at avoiding as far as
possible any divergence between the provi-
sions of Community acts and those of the
Lugano Convention;
(b) indicate their concern not to jeopardize the
unity of the legal system established by the
Lugano Convention. This is an obvious con-
cern if we consider that the Lugano Conven-
tion, through rules based firmly on the Brus-
sels Convention, is intended to guarantee the
free movement of judgments among the great
majority of West European States, i.e. includ-
ing judgments delivered by the courts of the
Member States of the Communities;
128. The questions raised by Community acts were
amongst the most difficult with which the drafters
of the Lugano Convention had to deal. A solution
was reached thanks to the constructive will of the
representatives of all the States concerned. This
compromise solution appears to us to allay the
concern shown on both sides. To summarize, it
may be said to be a three-storey edifice:
(a) it places Community acts on the same footing
as conventions on particular matters, which
corresponds to the wishes of the Community
Member States;
(b) the Community Member States have given a
unilateral undertaking to make every effort to
ensure that the unity of the legal system
established by the Lugano Convention is not
put in jeopardy, which satisfies the EFT 
Member States;
(c) the Community Member States consequently
undertake, when drafting Community acts, to
take all the steps in their power to ensure that
the rules contained in the Lugano Conven-
tion are complied with, particularly as regards
the protection which the Convention gives a
( c) as a corrective, there is the undertaking to
seek a negotiated solution in the case of a
divergence between a Community act and the
Lugano Convention. As we have stated, this
satisfies both sides.
The compromise thus appears to be perfectly bal-
anced.
CHAPTER V
DECLARATIONS ANNEXED TO THE CONVENTION
129. The Lugano Convention is supplemented by three Declarations. The first concerns
Protocol 3 which relates to Community acts (see points 120 to 128) and the two others
Protocol 2 on the uniform interpretation of the Convention (see points 110 to 119).28. 7. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 189/97
CHAPTER VI
JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF THE BRUSSELS CONVENTION
OF 27 SEPTEMBER 1968
General
130. The Protocol of 3 June 1971 confers on the Court
of Justice of the European Communities jurisdic-
tion to rule on the interpretation of the Brussels
Convention.
Article 30 of the Accession Convention of 9 Octo-
ber 1978 (Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom)
provides that the Court of Justice also has juris-
diction to rule on the interpretation of that Con-
vention. Article 10 of the Convention of 25 Octo-
ber 1982 on the accession of Greece contains a
similar provision.
As at 1 June 1988 the six original Member States
of the Communities together with Denmark, Ire-
land and the United Kingdom are parties to the
Protocol.
On the scope of the Protocol, reference should be
made to the Jenard report (pp. 66 to 70) and the
Schlosser report (paragraphs 255 and 256).
It should be noted, however, that the Protocol
makes provision for two forms of reference: refer-
ence for a preliminary ruling and reference in the
interests of the law. The latter possibility has not
so far been used. Reference for a preliminary rul-
ing means that a national court required to rule
on a question of interpretation of the Convention
or the Protocol refers the matter to the Court of
Justice and stays its proceedings, pending the lat-
ter s decision.
Since the Protocol came into force on 1 Septem-
ber 1975, nearly 60 judgments have been handed
down by the Court (see point 3 below) and a
number of case are currently pending (see point 4
below).
As stated in the comments on Protocol 2 (see
points 112 and 116), in the negotiations on the
Lugano Convention it was agreed that the provi-
sions of the Brussels Convention should be con-
strued as interpreted by the Court of Justice and
that the report would mention the various judg-
ments handed down by the Court.
This Chapter meets the latter stipulation.
The judgments are given not in chronological
order but by reference to those Articles of the
Brussels Convention, the Protocol annexed ther-
eto and the 1971 Protocol which have been inter-
preted, since this seems a more convenient
arrangement.
This Chapter gives only the operative part of the
decision and not, barring exceptions, the grounds.
For it is not the purpose of this report to study the
judgments of the Court of Justice but merely to
indicate how it has interpreted a number of Arti-
cles.
Content of the judgments (11
131. (1)  Application of the Convention
National procedural laws are set aside in the mat-
ters governed by the Convention in favour of the
provisions thereof (judgment of 13 November
1979 in Case 25/79 Sanicentral v. Collin (1979)
ECR 3423-3431).
(2)  Article  first paragraph: Civil and commercial
matters
1. The Court held that the concept of civil and
commercial matters must be regarded as autono-
mous. It ruled that a judgment given in an action
between a public authority and a person governed
by private law, in which the public authority has
acted 'in the exercise of its powers , is excluded
from the area of application of the Convention
(judgment of 14 October 1976 in Case 29/76 L TU
v. Eurocontrol (1976) ECR 1541- 1552).
2. It confirmed its decision in its judgment of
16 December 1980 in Case 814/79 Netherlands
State v. Ruffer to the effect that the concept of
civil and commercial matters does not include the
recovery of the costs incurred by the agent res-
ponsible for administering public waterways, in
this instance the Netherlands State, in the remo-
val of a wreck pursuant to an international Con-
vention ((1980) ECR 3807 -3822).
3. Contracts of employment come within the
scope of the Convention (judgment of 13 Novem-
ber 1979 in Case 25/79 Sanicentral v. Collin
(1979) ECR 3423-3431).
(3)  Article  second paragraph
(1) (a) Status of persons
1. Judicial decisions authorizing provisional
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do not fall within the scope of the Convention '
those measures concern or are closely connected
with either questions of the status of the persons
involved in the divorce proceedings or proprie-
tory legal relations resulting directly from the
matrimonial relationship or the dissolution there-
of (judgment of 27 March 1979 in Case 143/78 J.
De Cavel v. L. De Cavel (1979) ECR 1055- 1068).
2. However, the Convention is applicable, on
the one hand, to the enforcement of an interlocu-
tory order made by a French court in divorce pro-
ceedings whereby one of the parties to the pro-
ceedings is awarded  monthly maintenance
allowance and, on the other hand, to an interim
compensation payment payable monthly,
awarded to one of the parties by a French divorce
judgment pursuant to Article 270  et seq.  of the
French Civil Code.
The Court held that the scope of the Convention
extends to maintenance obligations and that the
treatment of an ancillary claim is not necessarily
linked to that of the principal claim.
Ancillary claims come within the scope of the
Convention according to the subject matter with
. which they are concerned and not according to
the subject matter involved in the principal claim
(judgment of 6 March 1980 in Case 120/79 L. 
Cavel v. J. De Cavel (1980) ECR 731).
(b) Mat rim 0 n i a Ire I at ion s hip s
I. The term 'rights in property arising out of a
matrimonial relationship' includes not only pro-
perty arrangements specifically and exclusively
envisaged by certain national legal systems in the
case of marriage but also any proprietory relation-
ships resulting directly from the matrimonial rela-
tionship or the dissolution thereof (judgment of
27 March 1979 in Case 143/78 J. De Cavel v. L.
De Cavel (1979) ECR 1055- 1068).
2. An application for provisional measures to
secure the delivery up of a document in order to
prevent it from being used as evidence in an ac-
tion concerning a husband's management of his
wife s property does not fall within the scope of
the Convention if such management is closely
connected with the proprietary relationship result-
ing directly from the marriage bond (judgment of
31 March 1982 in Case 25/81 C. H. W. v. G. J. H.
(1982) ECR 1189- 1205).
(2) Bankruptcy
A decision such as that of a French civil court
based on Article 99 of the French Law of 13 July
1967, ordering the. de facto manager of a legal
person to pay a certain sum into the assets of a
company must be considered as given in the con-
text of bankruptcy or analogous proceedings
(judgment of 22 February 1979 in Case 133/78
Gourdain v. Nadler (1979) ECR 733-746).
(4)  Article  5 (1):  Contractual matters
I. The place of performance of the obligation in
question is to be determined in accordance with
the law which governs the obligations in question
according to the rules of conflict of laws of the
court before which the matter is brought (judg-
ment of 6 October 1978 in Case 12/76 Tessili v.
Dunlop (1976) ECR 1473- 1487).
2. If the place of performance of a contractual
obligation has been specified by the parties in a
clause which is valid according to the national
law applicable to the contract, the court for that
place has jurisdiction to take cognizance of dis-
putes relating to that obligation under Article 5
(I), irrespective of whether the formal conditions
provided for under Article 17 have been observed
(judgment of 17 January 1980 in Case 56/79 ZeI-
ger v. Salinitri (1980) ECR 89-98).
3. The word 'obligation' contained in Article 
(I) refers to the contractual obligation forming the
basis of the legal proceedings, namely the obliga-
tion of the grantor in the case of an exclusive
sales contract (judgment of 6 October 1976 in
Case 14/76 De Bloos v. Bouyer).
4. The plaintiff may invoke the jurisdiction of
the courts of the place of performance in accord-
ance with Article 5 (I) of the Convention even
when the existence of the contract is in dispute
between the parties (judgment of 4 March 1982 in
Case 38/81 Effer v. Kantner (1982) ECR 825-
836).
5. The obligation to be taken into account for
the purposes of the application of Article 5 (I) of
the Convention in the case of claims based on
different obligations arising under a contract of
employment as a representative binding a worker
to an undertaking is the obligation which charac-
terizes the contract, i.e. that of the place where the
work is carried out (judgment of 26 May 1982 in
Case 133/82 Ivenel v. Schwab (1982) ECR 1891-
1902).
6. The concept of matters relating to a contract
is an autonomous concept. Obligations in regard
to the payment of a sum of money which have
their basis in the relationship existing between an28. 7. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 189/99
association and its members by virtue of member-
ship are 'matters relating to a contract', whether
the obligations in question arise simply from the
act of becoming a member or from decisions
made by organs of the association (judgment of
22 March 1983 in Case 34/82 Peters v. Znav
(1983) ECR 987- 1004).
7. For the purpose of determining the place of
performance within the meaning of Article 5 (l),
the obligation to be taken into consideration in an
action for the recovery of fees, commenced by an
architect commissioned to prepare plans for the
building of houses, is the contractual obligation
actually forming the basis of the legal proceed-
Ings.
In the case in point that obligation consists of a
debt for a sum of money payable at the defend-
ant's permanent address.
The place of payment is determined by the law
applicable to the contract (judgment of 15 Janu-
ary 1987 in Case 266/85 Shenavai v. Kreischer
OJ No C 39 17. 1987, p. 3).
8. (a) On the question of whether a claim for
compensation for sudden and premature
termination of an agreement was a matter
relating to a contract or to q\J.asi-delict
the Court of Justice replied that 'proceed-
ings relating to the wrongful repudiation
of an independent commercial agency
agreement and the payment of commis-
sion due under such an agreement are
proceedings in matters relating to a con-
tract within the meaning of Article 5 (I)
of the Brussels Convention
(b) It repeated that matters relating to a con-
tract should be regarded as an  autono-
mous concept (judgment of 22 March
1983 in Case 34/82 Peters v. Znav).
(c) Compensation for wrongful repudiation
of an agreement is based on failure to
comply with a contractual obligation.
(d) Lastly, the Court referred to the Rome
Convention of 19 June 1980 on the law
applicable to contractual obligations
which includes (Article 10) within the
field of the law applicable to a contract
the consequences of total or partial non-
performance of the obligations arising
from it and hence the contractual liability
of the party responsible for non-perform-
ance (judgment of 8 March 1988 in Case
9/87 Arcado v. Haviland, OJ No C 89
4. 1988, p. 9).
(5)  Article  5 (2):  Maintenance
The subject of maintenance obligations falls
within the scope of the Convention even if the
claim in question is ancillary to divorce proceed-
ings (judgment of 6 March 1980 in Case 120/79
L. De Cavel v. J. De Cavel (1980) ECR 731).
(6)  Article  5 (3):  Tort or delict
I. The expression 'place where the harmful
event occurred' must be understood as being
intended to cover both the place where the dam-
age occurred and the place of the event giving rise
to it.
The result is that the defendant may be sued, at
the option of the plaintiff, either in the courts for
the place where the damage occurred or in the
courts for the place of the event which gives rise
to and is at the origin of that damage (judgment
of 30 November 1976 in Case 21/76 Bier, Rein-
water v. Mines de potasse d' Alsace (1976) ECR
1735- 1748).
(a) The term 'tort, delict or quasi-delict' in
Article 5 (3) of the Convention must be
regarded as an autonomous concept cov-
ering all actions which seek to establish
the liability of a defendant and which are
not related to a ' contract' within the
meaning of Article 5 (I).
(b) A court which has jurisdiction under
Article 5 (3) to entertain an action with
regard to tortious matters does not have
jurisdiction to entertain that action with
regard to other matters not based on tort
(judgment of 27 September 1988 in Case
189/87 Kalfelis v. Schroder, OJ 
C 281 , 4. 11. 1988, p. 18).
(7)  Article  5 (5):  Branch. agency or other establish-
ment
1. When the grantee of an exclusive sales con-
cession is not subject either to the control or to
the direction of the grantor, he cannot be
regarded as being at the head of a branch, agency
or other establishment of the grantor within the
meaning of Article 5 (5) (judgment of 6 October
1976 in Case 14/76 De Bloos v. Bouyer (1976)
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2. The Court has given an  autonomous  interpre-
tation to the concepts of 'operations of a branch
agency or other establishment'
(a) the concept of branch, agency or other estab-
lishment implies a place of business which
has the appearance of permanency, such as
the extension of a parent body, has a manage-
ment and is materially equipped to negotiate
business with third parties so that the latter
although knowing that there will if necessary
be a legal link with the parent body, the head
office of which is abroad, do not have to deal
directly with such parent body but may trans-
act business at the place of business constitut-
ing the extension;
(b) the concept of ' operations' comprises:
(1) actions relating to rights and contractual
or non-contractual obligations concern-
ing the management properly so-called of
the agency, branch or other establishment
itself such as those concerning the situa-
tion of the building where such entity is
established or the local engagement of
staff to work there
(2) actions relating to undertakings which
have been entered into at the abovemen-
tioned place of business in the name of
the parent body and which must be per-
formed in the Contracting State where the
place of business is established
(3) actions concerning non-contractual obli-
gations arising from the activities in
which the branch, agency or other estab-
lishment has engaged at the place in
which it is established on behalf of the
parent body (judgment of 22 November
1978 in Case 33/78 Somafer v. Ferngas
(1978) ECR 2183-2195).
3. An 'independent commercial agent' , inas-
much as he is free to arrange his own work and
the undertaking which he represents may not
prevent him from representing several firms at the
same time and he merely transmits orders to the
parent undertaking without being involved in
either their terms or their execution, does not have
the character of a branch (judgment of 18 March
1981 in Case 139/80 Blanckaert & Willems v.
Trost (1981) ECR 819-830).
4. Article 5 (5) must be interpreted as applying
to a case in which a legal person established in a
Contracting State does not operate any depend-
ent branch, agency or other establishment in
another Contracting State but nevertheless pur-
sues its activities there by means of an indepen-
dent undertaking which has the same name and
identical management, which negotiates and con-
ducts business in its name and which it uses as an
extension of itself (judgment of 9 December 1987
in Case 218/86 Schotte v. Rotschild, OJ No C 2
6. 1. 1988, p. 3).
(7a)  Article  6 (1):  Co-defendants
For the application of Article 6 (1) of the Conven-
tion there must exist between the various actions
brought by the same plaintiff against different
defendants a link such that it is expedient to
determine those actions together in order to avoid
the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from
separate proceedings (judgment of 27 September
1988 in Case 189/87 Kalfelis v. Schroder, OJ No
C 281, 4. 11. 1988, p. 18).
(8)  Article  13:  Sale of goods on instalment credit
terms and loans repayable by instalments
The Court ruled in favour of an autonomous con-
cept of the sale of goods on instalment credit
terms albeit implicitly in that it is not to be under-
stood to extend to the sale of a machine which
one company agrees to make to another company
on the basis of a price to be paid by way of bills
of exchange spread over a period.
The jurisdictional advantage is to be restricted to
buyers who are in need of protection (judgment
of 21 June 1978 in Case 150/77 Bertrand v. Ott
(1978) ECR 1431- 1447).
It should be noted that this Article was amended
in the 1978 Convention in line with the judgment.
(9)  Article  16 (1):  Immovable property
1. The concept of 'matters relating to . . . tenan-
cies of immovable property' must not be inter-
preted as including an agreement to rent under a
usufructuary lease a retail business carried on in
immovable property rented from a third person
by the lessor.
Article 16 (1) must not be given a wider interpre-
tation than is required by its objective (judgment
of 14 December 1977 in Case 73/77 Sanders 
Van Der Putte).
2. Article 16 (1) applies to alllettings of immov-
able property (judgment of 15 January 1985 in28. 7. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 189/101
Case 241/83 Rosier v. Rottwinkel (1985) ECR
99-129).
Article 17 is fulfilled only if the contract
signed by both parties contains an
express reference to those general condi-
tions and This not uncontroversial judgment was not fol-
lowed in the Lugano Convention (see points 
and 51). Nor was it in line with the views of those
who framed the 1968 Convention (see Jenard
report, page 35 and Schlosser report, paragraph
164).
(b) in the case of a contract concluded by
reference to earlier offers, which were
themselves made with reference to the
general conditions of one of the parties
including a clause conferring jurisdic-
tion, the requirement of a writing under
the first paragraph of Article 17 is satis-
fied only if the reference is express and
can therefore be checked by a party exer-
cising reasonable care (judgment of 
December 1976 in Case 24/76 Colzani v.
Ruwa (1976) ECR 1831- 1843).
3. Article 16 (I) must be interpreted as meaning
that in a dispute as to the existence of a lease
relating to immovable property situated in two
Contracting States (Belgium and the Netherlands
in the case in point), exclusive jurisdiction over
the property situated in each Contracting State is
held by the courts of that State (judgment 
6 July 1988 in Case 158/87 Scherens v. Maenhout
and Van Poucke, OJ No C 211 , II. 8. 1988, p. 7).
(10)  Article  16 (4):  Patents
(a) In the case of an orally concluded con-
tract, the requirements of the first para-
graph of Article 17 as to form are satis-
fied only if the vendor s confirmation in
writing accompanied by notification of
the general conditions of sale has been
accepted in writing by the purchaser and
See the judgment of 15 November 1983 in Case
288/82 Duijnstee v. Goderbauer (1983) ECR
3663-3679.
(II)  Article  16 (5):  Applications to oppose enforce-
ment (b) the fact that the purchaser does not raise
any objections against a confirmation
issued unilaterally by the other party
does not amount to acceptance on his
part of the clause conferring jurisdiction
unless the oral agreement comes within
the framework of a continuing trading
relationship between the parties which is
based on the general conditions of one
of them, and those conditions contain a
clause conferring jurisdiction (judgment
of 14 December 1976 in Case 25/76
Segoura v. Bonakdarian (1976) ECR
1851- 1863).
Applications to oppose enforcement, as provided
for under paragraph 767 of the German Code of
Civil Procedure, fall, as such, within the jurisdic-
tion provision contained in Article 16 (5) of the
Convention; that provision does not however
make it possible, in an application to oppose
enforcement made to the courts of the Contract-
ing State in which enforcement is to take place, to .
plead a set-off between the right whose enforce-
ment is being sought and a claim over which the
courts of that State would have no jurisdiction if
it were raised independently.
The Court held that this amounts to a clear abuse
of the process on the part of the plaintiff for the
purpose of obtaining indirectly from the German
courts a decision regarding a claim over which
those courts have no jurisdiction under the Con-
vention (judgment of 4 July 1985 in Case 220/84
AS-Autoteile v. Malhe (1985) ECR 2267-2279).
(a) The first paragraph of Article 17 cannot
be interpreted as prohibiting an agree-
ment under which the two parties to a
contract for sale, who are domiciled in
different States, can be sued only in the
courts of their respective States and
(a) Where a clause conferring jurisdiction is
included among the general conditions
of sale of one of the parties, printed on
the back of a contract, the requirement
of a writing under the first paragraph of
(b) in the above case the Article cannot be
interpreted as prohibiting the court
before which a dispute has been brought
in pursuance of such a clause from tak-
ing into account a set-off connected with
the legal relationship in dispute (judg-
ment of 9 November 1978 in Case 23/78
Meeth v. Glacetal (1978) ECR 2133-
2144).
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(a) National procedural laws are set aside in
the matters governed by the Convention
in favour of the provisions thereof and
(b) in judicial proceedings instituted after
the coming into force of the Convention
clauses conferring jurisdiction included
in contracts of employment concluded
prior to that date must be considered
valid even in cases in which they would
have been regarded as void under the
national law in force at the time when
the contract was entered into (judgment
of 13 November 1979 in Case 25/79 San-
icentral v. Collin (1979) ECR 3423-3431).
5. If the place of performance of a contractual
obligation has been specified by the parties in a
clause which is valid according to the national
law applicable to the contract, the court for that
place has jurisdiction to take cognizance of dis-
putes relating to that obligation under Article 5
(1) of the Convention, irrespective of whether the
formal conditions provided for under Article 
have been observed (judgment of 17 January 1980
in Case 56/79 Zeiger v. Salinitri (1980) ECR 89-
98).
6. Article 17 must be interpreted as meaning that
the legislation of a Contracting State may not
allow the validity of an agreement conferring jur-
isdiction to be called in question solely on the
ground that the language used is not that pre-
scribed by that legislation (judgment of 24 June
1981 in Case 150/81 Elefanten Schuh v. Jacqmain
(1981) ECR 1671- 1690).
7. Article 17 must be interpreted as meaning that
where a contract of insurance, entered into
between an insurer and a policy-holder and stipu-
lated by the latter to be for his benefit and to
enure for the benefit for third parties, contains a
clause conferring jurisdiction relating to proceed-
ings which might be brought by such third parties
the latter, even if they have not expressly signed
the said clause, may rely upon it (judgment of
14 July 1983 in Case 201/82 Gerling v. Amminis-
trazione del tesoro dello Stato (1983) ECR 2503-
2518).
8. On bills of lading, the Court handed down a
judgment to the effect that:
(a) the bill of lading issued by the carrier to the
shipper may be regarded as an 'agreement'
evidenced in writing' between the parties
within the meaning of Article 17. The juris-
diction clause applies if the parties have
signed the bill of lading. If the clause confer-
ring jurisdiction appears in the general con-
ditions, the shipper must have expressly
accepted it in writing. The wording of the bill
of lading signed by both parties must
expressly refer to the general conditions.
However, if the carrier and the shipper have
a continuing business relationship, which is
governed as a whole by the carrier s general
conditions, the clause conferring jurisdiction
applies even without acceptance in writing;
(b) the bill of lading issued by the carrier to the
shipper may be regarded as an 'agreement'
evidenced in writing , within the meaning of
Article 17 vis-a-vis  a third party holding the
bill only if that third party is bound by an
agreement with the carrier under the relevant
national law and if the bill of lading, as ' evi-
dence in writing' of the 'agreement' , satisfies
the formal conditions- in Article 17 (judgment
of 19 June 1984 in Case 71/83 Russ v. Nova
Goeminne (1984) ECR 2417-2436).
9. The court of a Contracting State before which
the applicant, without raising any objection as to
the court's jurisdiction, enters an appearance in
proceedings relating to a claim for a set-off which
is not based on the same contract or subject-mat-
ter as the claims in his application and in respect
of which there is a valid agreement conferring
exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of another
Contracting State within the meaning of Article
17 has jurisdiction by virtue of Article 18 (judg-
ment of 7 March 1985 in Case 48/84 Spitzley 
Sommer (1985) ECR 787-800).
10. The first paragraph of Article L 7 must be
interpreted as meaning that the formal require-
ments therein laid down are satisfied if it is estab-
lished that jurisdiction was conferred by express
oral agreement, that written confirmation of that
agreement by  one  of the parties was received by
the other and that the latter raised no objection
(judgment of 11 July 1985 in Case 221/84 Berg-
hoefer v. ASA (1985) ECR 2699-2710).
11. An agreement conferring jurisdiction is not
to be regarded as having been concluded for the
benefit of only one of the parties, within the
meaning of the third paragraph of Article 17 of
the Convention, where all that is established is
that the parties have agreed that a court or the
courts of the Contracting State in which that party
is domiciled are to have jurisdiction.
The Court held that clauses which expressly state
the name of the party for whose benefit they were
agreed and those which, whilst specifying the
courts in which either party may sue the other
give one of them a wider choice of courts must be28. Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 189/103
regarded as clauses whose wording shows that
they were agreed for the exclusive benefit of one
of the parties (judgment of 24 June 1986 in Case
22/85 Anterist v. Credit Lyonnais, OJ No C 196
8. 1986).
12. Article 17 must be interpreted as meaning
that where a written agreement containing a jur-
isdiction clause and stipulating that the agree-
ment can be renewed only in writing has expired
but has continued to serve as the legal basis for
the contractual relations between the parties, the
jurisdiction clause satisfies the formal require-
ments in Article 17 if, under the law applicable
the parties could validly renew the original con-
tract otherwise than in writing, or if, conversely,
either party has confirmed in writing either the
jurisdiction clause or the group of clauses which
have been tacitly renewed and of which the jur-
isdiction clause forms part, without any objection
on the part of the other party to whom such con-
firmation has been notified (judgment of 11 Nov-
ember 1986 in Case 313/85 Iveco Fiat v. Van
Hool, OJ No C 308 2. 12. 1986, p. 4).
(13)  Article  18:  Submission to the jurisdiction
(a) Article 18 applies even where the parties
have by agreement designated a court in
another State since Article 17 is not one
of the exceptions laid down in Article 
and
(b) Article 18 is applicable where the
defendant not only contests the court
jurisdiction but also makes submissions
on the substance of the action, provided
that, if the challenge to jurisdiction is not
preliminary to any defence as to the sub-
stance, it does not occur after the making
of the submissions which under national
procedural law are considered to be the
first defence addressed to the court
seised (judgment of 24 June 1981 in Case
150/81 Elefanten Schuh v. Jacqmain
(1981) ECR 1671-1690).
(See also the judgments of 22 October
1981 in Case 27/81 Rohr v. Ossberger
31 March 1982 in Case 25/81 C. H. W. v.
G. J. Hand 14 July 1983 in Case 201182
Gerling v. Amministrazione del tesoro
dello Stato.
2. The court of a Contracting State before which
the applicant, without raising any objection as to
the court s jurisdiction, enters an appearance in
proceedings relating to a claim for a set-off which
is not based on the same contract or subject mat-
ter as the claims in his application and in respect
of which there is a valid agreement conferring
exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of another
Contracting State within the meaning of Article
17 of the Convention of 27 September - 1968 on
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters has jurisdiction by
virtue of Article 18 of that Convention (judgment
of 7 March 1985 in Case 48/84 Spitzley v. Som-
mer (1985) ECR 787-800).
(14)  Article  19:  Examination of jurisdiction
Article 19 requires the national court to declare 
its own motion that it has no jurisdiction when-
ever it finds that a court of another Contracting
State has exclusive jurisdiction under Article 
of the Convention, even in an appeal in cassation
where the national rules of procedure limit the
court s review to the grounds raised by the parties
(judgment of 15 November 1983 in Case 288/82
Duijnstee v. Goderbauer (1983) ECR 3663-3679).
(15)  Article  21:  Lis pendens
1. See the judgment of 7 June 1984 in Case
129/83 Zeiger v. Salinitri.
2. The term  /is pendens  used in Article 21 covers
a case where a party brings an action before a
court in a Contracting State for a declaration that
an international sales contract is inoperative or
for the termination thereof whilst an action by the
other party to secure performance of the said con-
tract is pending before a court in another Con-
tracting State.
The Court also ruled that the terms used in Article
21 to determine a situation of  /is pendens  are to be
regarded as  autonomous  concepts (judgment of
8 December 1987 in Case 144/86 Gubisch v. Pal-
umbo, OJ No C 8 13. l. 1988, p. 3).
(16)  Article  22:  Related actions
Article 22 does not confer jurisdiction.
It applies only where related actions are brought
before courts of two or more Contracting States
(judgment of 24 June 1981 in Case 150/81 Ele-
ranten Schuh v. Jacqmain (1981) ECR 1671-
1690).No. C 189/104 Official Journal of the European Communities 28.
(17)  Article  24:  Provisional, including protective
measures
I. The inclusion of provisional measures in the
scope of the Convention is determined not by
their own nature but by the nature of the rights
which they serve to protect (judgment of
27 March 1979 in Case 143/78 J. De Cavel v. 
De Cavel (1979) ECR 1055- 1068).
intended to be enforced without prior service do
not come within the system of recognition and
enforcement provided for by Title III of the Con-
vention (judgment of 21 May 1980 in Case
125/79 Denilauler v. Couchet (1980) ECR 1553).
2. Article 27 (2) must be interpreted as follows:
2. On the enforcement of judicial decisions
authorizing provisional and protective measures
see Article 27 below (judgment of 21 May 1980 in
Case 125/79 Denilauler v. Couchet (1980) ECR
1553).
(a) the words 'the document which insti-
tuted the proceedings' cover any docu-
ment, such as the order for payment
(Zahlungsbefehl) in German law;
3. Article 24 may not be relied on to bring
within the scope of the Convention provisional
measures relating to matters which are excluded
from it (judgment of 31 March 1982 in Case
25/81 C. H. W. v. G. J. H. (1982) ECR 1189-
1205).
(b) a decision such as the enforcement order
(Vollstreckungsbefehl) in German law is
not covered by the words 'the document
which instituted the proceedings
(18)  Article  26:  Recognition
(c) in order to determine whether the
defendant has been enabled to arrange
for his defence as required by Article 
(2) the court in which enforcement is
sought must take account only of the
time, such as that allowed under German
law for submitting an objection (Wider-
spruch), available to the defendant for
the purposes of preventing the issue of a
judgment in default which is enforceable
under the Convention;
foreign judgment recognized by virtue of
Article 26 must  in principle  have the same effects
in the State in which enforcement is sought as it
does in the State in which the judgment was
gIven.
Subject, however, it should be added, to the
grounds for non-recognition laid down in the
Convention (judgment of 4 February 1988 in
Case 145/86 Hoffmann v. Krieg. See also in the
same case the Court' s interpretation of Articles 27
(I) and (3), 31 and 36, OJ No C 63 , 8. 3. 1988
6).
(d) Article 27 (2) remains applicable where
the defendant has lodged an objection
against the decision given in default and
a court of the State in which the judg-
ment was given has held the objection to
be inadmissible on the ground that the
time for lodging an objection has
expired;
(19)  Article  27 ( 1): Public policy
(e) even if a court of the State in which the
judgment was given has held, in separate
adversary proceedings, that service was
duly effecte, Article 27 (2) still requires
the court in which enforcement is sought
to examine whether service was effected
in sufficient time to enable the defend-
ant to arrange for his defence;
Recourse to the public policy clause, which is to
be had only in exceptional cases, ... is in any
event not possible where the problem is one of
compatibility of  foreign judgment with a
domestic judgment. That problem must be
resolved on the basis of Article 27 (3), which cov-
ers the case of a foreign judgment irreconcilable
with a judgment given between the same parties
in the State in which enforcement is sought (judg-
ment of 4 February 1988 in Case 145/86 Hoff-
mann v. Krieg, OJ No C 63, 8. 3. 1988, p. 6).
(20)  Article  27 (2):  Rights of the defence
(f) the court in which enforcement is sought
may as a general rule confine itself to
examining whether the period, reckoned
from the date on which service was duly
effected, allowed the defendant suffi-
cient time for his defence; it must, how-
ever, consider whether, in a particular
case, there are exceptional circumstances
such as the fact that, although service
was duly effected, it was inadequate for
the purposes of causing that time to
begin to run;
I. Judicial decisions authorizing provisional or
protective measures, which are delivered without
the party against which they are directed having
been summoned to appear and which are28. Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 189/105
(g) Article 52 of the Convention and the fact
that the court of the State in which
enforcement is sought concluded that
under the law of that State the defendant
was habitually resident within its terri-
tory at the date of service of the docu-
ment which instituted the proceedings
do not affect the replies given above
(judgment of 16 June 1981 in Case
166/80 Klomps v. Michel (1981) ECR
1593- 1612).
and Plouvier v. Bouwman (1985) ECR
1779- 1803 ).
(21)  Article  27 (3):  lrreconcilablejudgments
3. The court of the State in which enforcement
is sought may, if it considers that the conditions
laid down by Article 27 (2) are fulfilled, refuse to
grant recognition and enforcement of a judgment
even though the court of the State in which the
judgment was given regarded it as proven, in
accordance with the third paragraph of Article 
of that Convention in conjunction with Article 
of the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965
that the defendant, who failed to enter an appear-
ance, had an opportunity to receive service of the
document instituting the proceedings in sufficient
time to enable him to make arrangements for his
defence (judgment of 15 July 1982 in Case 288/81
Pendy Plastic Products v. Pluspunkt (1982) ECR
2723-2737).
A foreign judgment ordering a person to make
maintenance payments to his spouse by virtue of
his obligations, arising out of the marriage, to
support her is irreconcilable for the purposes of
Article 27 (3) with a national judgment which has
decreed the divorce of the spouses in question
(judgment of 4 February 1988 in Case 145/86
Hoffmann v. Krieg, OJ No C 63, 8. 3. 1988, p. 6).
(22)  Articles 30 and  38:  Ordinary appeal
The Court ruled in favour of an  autonomous  con-
cept of ordinary appeal. An 'ordinary appeal' is
constituted by any appeal:
(a) which is such that it may result in the annul-
ment or the amendment of the judgment
which is the subject matter of the procedure
for recognition or enforcement and
(a) Article 27 (2) is also applicable, in res-
pect of its requirement that service of the
document which instituted the proceed-
ings should have been effected in suffi-
cient time, where service was effected
within a period prescribed by the court
of the State in which the judgment was
given or where the defendant resided
exclusively or otherwise, within the jur-
isdiction of that court or in the same
country as that court.
(b) the lodging of which is bound, in the State in
which the judgment was given, to a period
which is laid down by the law and starts to
run by virtue of that same judgment (judg-
ment of 22 November 1977 in Case 43/77
Industrial Diamond v. Riva (1977) ECR
2175-2191).
(23)  Article  31:  Enforcement
(b) In examining whether service was
effected in sufficient time, the court in
which enforcement is sought may take
account of exceptional circumstances
which arose  after  service was duly
effected.
I. The provisions of the Convention prevent a
party who has obtained a judgment in his favour
in a Contracting State, being a judgment for
which an order for enforcement under Article 
may issue in another Contracting State, from
making an application to a court in that other
State for a judgment against the other party in the
same terms as the judgment delivered in the first
State (judgment in Case 42/76 De Wolf v. Cox).
2. A foreign judgment the enforcement of which
has been ordered in a Contracting State pursuant
to Article 31, and which remains enforceable in
the State in which it was given, need not remain
enforceable in the State in which enforcement is
sought when, under the legislation of the latter
State, it ceases to be enforceable for reasons
which lie outside the scope of the Convention. (c) The fact that the plaintiff was apprised
of the defendant's new address , after ser-
. vice was effected, and the fact that the
defendant was responsible for the failure
of the duly served document to reach
him are matters which the court in which
enforcement is sought may take into
account in assessing whether service was
effected in sufficient time (judgment of
11 June 1985 in Case 49/84 Debaecker
In the case in point a foreign judgment ordering a
person to make maintenance payments to his
spouse by virtue of his obligations, arising out of
the marriage, to support her is irreconcilable with
national judgment which has decreed the
divorce of the spouses in question (judgment of
4 February 1988 in Case 145/86 Hoffman 
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(24)  Article  33:  Addressfor service
(a) The second paragraph of Article 33 must
be interpreted as meaning that the
requirement to give an address for ser-
vice laid down in that provision must be
complied with in accordance with the
rules laid down by the law of the State in
which enforcement is sought or, if those
rules do not specify when that require-
ment must be complied with no later
than  the date on which the enforcement
order is served.
(b) The consequences of an infringement of
the rules concerning the choice of an
address for service are, by virtue of
Article 33 of the Convention, governed
by the law of the State in which enforce-
ment is sought, provided that the aims of
the Convention are respected, i.e. the law
of the latter State remains subject to the
aims of the Convention; the penalty can-
not therefore call into question the valid-
ity of the judgment granting enforcement
or allow the rights of the party against
whom enforcement is sought to be pre-
judiced (judgment of 10 July 1986 
Case 198/85 Carron v. FRG, OJ 
C 209, 20. 8. 1986, p. 5).
(25)  Article  36:  Enforcement procedure
(a) Article 36 of the Convention excludes
any procedure whereby interested third
parties may challenge an enforcement
order, even where such a procedure is
available to third parties under the
domestic law of the State in which the
enforcement order is granted.
(b) The Court held that the Convention has
established an enforcement procedure
which constitutes an  autonomous  and
complete  system including the matter of
appeals. It follows that Article 36 of the
Convention excludes procedures where-
by interested third parties may challenge
an enforcement order under domestic
law.
(c) The Convention merely regulates the
procedure for obtaining an order for the
enforcement of foreign enforceable
instruments and does not deal with exe-
cution itself, which continues to be gov-
erned by the domestic law of the court in
which execution is sought, so that inter-
ested third parties may contest execution
by means of the procedures available to
them under the law of the State in which
execution is levied (judgment of 2 July
1985 in Case 148/84 Deutsche Genos-
senschaftsbank v. Brasserie du Pecheur
(1985) ECR 1981-1993).
2. The Article must be interpreted as meaning
that the party who has failed to appeal against the
enforcement order referred to in Article 31 (in the
case in point within one month of service of the
enforcement order) is thereafter precluded, at the
stage at which the judgment is enforced, from
relying upon a valid reason which he could have
invoked in such appeal. That rule is to be applied
ex officio by the courts of the State in which
enforcement is sought.  However that rule does
not apply when it has the effect of obliging the
national court to make the effects of a national
judgment lying outside the scope of the Conven-
tion ( divorce) conditional on that judgment being
recognized in the State in which the foreign judg-
ment whose enforcement is at issue was given
(judgment of 4 February 1988 in Case 145/86
Hoffman v. Krieg, OJ No C 63, 8. 3. 1988, p. 6).
(26)  Article  37:  Enforcement procedure
(a) The second paragraph of Article 37 must
be interpreted as meaning that an appeal
in cassation and, in the Federal Republic
of Germany, a 'Rechtsbeschwerde' may
be lodged only against the judgment
given on the appeal.
(b) That provision cannot be extended so as
to enable an appeal to be lodged against
a judgment other than that given on the
appeal, for instance against a prelimi-
nary or interlocutory order requiring pre-
liminary inquiries to be made (judgment
of 27 November 1984 in Case 258/83
Brennero v. Wendel (1984) ECR 3971-
3984).
(27)  Article  38:  Enforcement procedure
1. See (20) above on 'ordinary appeal'.
2. The second paragraph of Article 38 of the
Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction
and the enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters must be interpreted as mean-
ing that a court with which an appeal has been
lodged against a decision authorizing enforce-
ment, given pursuant to the Convention may
make enforcement conditional on the provision28. 7. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 189/107
of security only when it gives judgment on the
appeal (judgment of 27 November 1984 in Case
258/83 Brennero v. Wendel (1984) ECR 3971-
3984).
(28)  Article  39:  Enforcement procedure
(a) By virtue of Article 39 of the Conven-
tion, a party who has applied for and
obtained authorization for enforcement
may, within the period mentioned in that
Article, proceed directly with protective
measures against the property of the
party against whom enforcement is
sought and is under no obligation to
obtain specific authorization.
(b) A party who has obtained authorization
for enforcement may proceed with the
protective measures referred to in Article
39 until the expiry of the period pres-
cribed in Article 36 for lodging an appeal
and, if such an appeal is lodged, until a
decision is given thereon.
(c) A party who has proceeded with the pro-
tective measures referred to in Article 39
of the Convention is under no obligation
to obtain, in respect of those measures
any confirmatory judgment required by
the national law of the court in question
(judgment of 3 October 1985 in Case
119/84 Capelloni v. Pelkmans (1985)
ECR 3147-3164).
(29)  Article 40: Enforcement procedure
The court hearing .an appeal by a party seeking
enforcement is required to hear the party against
whom enforcement is sought, pursuant to the first
sentence of the second paragraph of Article 40 of
the Convention, even though the application for
an enforcement order was dismissed in the lower
court simply because documents were not pro-
duced at the appropriate time.
This is because the Convention formally requires
that both parties should be given a hearing at the
appellate level, without regard to the scope of the
decision in the lower court (judgment of 12 July
1984 in Case 178/83 P. v. K. (1984) ECR 3033-
3043).
(30)  Article  54:  Temporal application
The effect of Article 54 is that the only essential
for the rules of the Convention to be applicable to
litigation relating to legal relationships created
before the date of the coming into force of the
Convention is that the judicial proceedings
should have been instituted subsequently to that
date. This is true even if an agreement conferring
jurisdiction was concluded before the Convention
came into force and could be regarded as void
under the law applicable to it; the case in point
concerns a contract of employment between a
French employee and a German firm, to which
French law was applicable (judgment of 13 Nov-
ember 1979 in Case 25/79 Sanicentral v. Collin
(1979) ECR 3423-3431).
(31)  Articles  55  and  56:  Bilateral Conventions
As the first paragraph of Article 56 of the Con-
vention states that the bilateral Conventions
listed in Article 55 continue to have effect in rela-
tion to matters to which the Convention does not
apply, the court of the State in which enforcement
is sought may apply them to decisions which
without coming under the second paragraph of
Article  are excluded from the Convention
scope. This is the case as regards application of
the German-Belgian Convention of 1958, which
may continue to have effect in 'civil and commer-
cial matters , irrespective of the autonomous con-
struction placed upon that concept by the Court
for the purposes of interpretation of the 1968
Convention (judgment of 14 July 1977 in joined
Cases 9/77 and 10/77 Bavaria and Germanair v.
Eurocontrol (1977) ECR 1517- 1527).
(32)  Article I, second paragraph, of the Protocol
annexed to the Convention (Luxembourg)
clause conferring jurisdiction is not binding
upon a person domiciled in Luxembourg unless
that clause is mentioned in a provision:
(a) specially and exclusively meant for this pur-
pose;
(b) specifically signed by that party; in this res-
pect the signing of the contract as a whole
does not suffice. It is not necessary for that
clause to be mentioned in a separate docu-
ment (judgment of 6 May 1980 in Case
784/79 Porta-Leasing v. Prestige Interna-
tional (1980) ECR 1517).
(33)  Article II of the Protocol annexed to the Con-
vention
I. The expression 'an offence which was not
intentionally committed' should be understoodNo. C 189/108 Official Journal of the European Communities
as meaning any offence the legal definition of
which does not require the existence of intent
and
2. Article II of the Protocol applies in all crimi-
nal proceedings concerning offences which were
not intentionally committed
, '
in which the
accused' s liability at civil law, arising from the
elements of the offence for which he is being pro-
secuted, is in question or on which such liability
might subsequently be based' (judgment of
26 May 1981 in Case 157/80 Rinkau (1981) ECR
1391- 1484).
132. 3. List of judgments of the Court of Justice
(from 6 October 1976 to 27 September 1988)
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II. 10. 1976
III. 14. 10. 1976
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Prestige International
Denilauler v. Couchet
28.
(34)  Article  of the Protocol of  June  1971
Lower courts not sitting in an appellate capacity
are not empowered to seek a preliminary ruling
from the Court of Justice on a question of inter-
pretationof the Convention.
See the Court of Justice s order of 9 November
1983 in Case 80/83 Habourdin v. Italocremona
(1983) ECR 3639-3641) and order of 28 March
1984 in Case 56/84 Yon Gallera v. Maitre ((1984)
ECR 1769- 1772).
Article 5 (1)
Article 5 (I) and
Article 5 (5)
Article I
Article 5 (3)
Article 31
Article 17
paragraph I
Article 17
paragraph I
Article 56
Articles 30 and 38
Article 16 (I)
Article 13
Article 17
Article 5 (5)
Article I
paragraph 2, point 2
Articles I
paragraph 2, and 24
Articles 17 and 54
Articles 5 (I) and 
Articles 5 (2) and 24
Article I
paragraph 2
of Protocol
Title III
(1976) ECR
1473- 1487
(1976) ECR
1497 - 1511
(1976) ECR
1541- 1552
(1976) ECR
1735- 1748
(1976) ECR
1759- 1768
(1976) ECR
1831- 1843
(1976) ECR
1851- 1863
(1977) ECR
1517- 1527
(1977) ECR
2175-2191
(1977) ECR
2382-2392
(1978) ECR
1431- 1447
(1978) ECR
2133-2144
(1978) ECR
2183-2195
(1979) ECR
733- 746
(1979) ECR
1055- 1068
(1979) ECR
3423-3431
(1980) ECR
89-
(1980) ECR
731
(1980) ECR
1517
(1980) ECR
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XXI. 16. 12. 1980 Case 814/79 Netherlands State v. Article 1 (1980) ECR
Ruffer 3807-3822
XXII. 18. 3. 1981 Case 139/80 Blanckaert & Willems v. Article 5 (5) (1981) ECR
Trost 819-830
XXIII. 26, 5. 1981 Case 157/80 Rinkau Article II (1981) ECR
of Protocol 1391- 1404
XXIV. 16. 6. 1981 Case 166/80 Klomps v. Michel Article 27 (2) (1981) ECR
1593- 1612
XXV. 24, 6, 1981 Case 150/80 Elefenten Schuh v. Articles 17 (1981) ECR
Jacqmain 18 and 22 1671- 1698
paragraph I
XXVI. 22. 10. 1981 Case 27/81 Rohr v. Ossberger Article 18 (1981) ECR
2431-2448
XXVII. 3. 1982 Case 38/81 Effer v. Kantner Article 5 (I) (1982) ECR
825-836
XXVIII. 31. 1982 Case 25/81 C. H, W. v. G. J. H. Articles I (1982) ECR
18 and 24 1189- 1205
XXIX. 26. 5. 1982 Case 133/81 Ivenel v. Schwab Article 5 (I) (1982) ECR
1891- 1902
XXX, 15. 7, 1982 Case 228/81 Pendy Plastic Products Articles 20 (1982) ECR
v. Pluspunkt paragraph 3 2723-2737
and 27 (2)
XXXI. 22. 3. 1983 Case 34/82 Peters v. ZNA V Article 5 (1) (1983) ECR
987- 1004
XXXII. 14. 7. 1983 Case 20 I /82 Gerling v. Amminist- Articles 17 (1983) ECR
razione del Tesoro and 18 2503-2518
dello Stato
XXXIII. 21. 9. 1983 (order) Verheezen v. Muller Articles 1
Case 157/82 and 50
XXXIV. 15. 11. 1983 Case 288/82 Duijnstee v. Articles 16 (1983) ECR
Goderbauer (4) and  3663-3679
XXXv. 9. II. 1983 (order) Habourdin v. Article 2 of (1983) ECR
Case 80/83 Italocremona Protocol of 3639-3641
3. 6. 1971
XXXVI. 6. 1984 Case 129/83 Zeiger v~ Salinitri Article 21 (1984) ECR
2397-2409
XXXVII. 19. 6. 1984 Case 71/83 Russ v. Goeminne Article 17 (1984) ECR
2417-2436
XXXVIII. 12. 1984 Case 178/83 v. K. Article 40 (1984) ECR
3033-3043
XXXIX. 27. II. 1984 Case 258/83 Brennero v. Wendel Articles 37 (1984) ECR
and 38 3971-3984
XL. 15. I. 1985 Case 241/83 Rosier v. Rottwinkel Article 16 (1) (1985) ECR
99- 129
XLI. 3. 1985 Case 48/84 Spitzley v. Sommer Articles 17 (1985) ECR
and 18 787-800
XLII. 11. 6. 1985 Case 49/84 Debaecker & Plouvier Article 27 (1985) ECR
v. Bouwman 1779- 1803
XLIII. 1985 Case 148/84 Genossenschaftsbank v. Article 36 (1985) ECR
Brasserie du Pecheur 1981- 1993
XLIV. 7, 1985 Case 228/84 AS-Autoteile v. Article 16 (5) (1985) ECR
Malhe 2267-2279
XLV. 11. 1985 Case 221/84 Berghoefer v. ASA Article 17 (1985) ECR
2699-2710
XLVI. 3. 10. 1985 Case 119/84 Capelloni-Aquilini v. Article 39 (1985) ECR
Pelkmans 3147-3164
XLVII. 24. 1986 Case 22/85 Anterist v. Credit Article 17 OJ No C 196
Lyonnais 8. 1986, p. 5
XL VIII. 10. 1986 Case 198/85 Carron v. FRG Article 33 OJ No C 209
20. 8. 1986, p. 5No. C 189/110 Official Journal of the European Communities 28. 7. 90
XLIX. II. 11. 1986 Case 313/85 I veco Fiat v. Article 17
Van Hool
15. l. 1987 Case 266/85 Shenavai v. Kreischer Article 5 (1)
LI. 8. 12. 1987 Case 144/86 Gubisch v. Palumbo Article 21
LIt 12. 1987 Case 218/86 Schotte v. Rothschild Article 5 (5)
LIB. 1988 Case 145/86 Hoffman v. Krieg Articles 26
31 and 36
LlV, 3. 1988 Case 9/87 Arcado v. Haviland Article 5 (I)
LV, 7. 1988 Case 158/87 Scherens v. Maenhout Article 16 (I)
LVI. 27. 1988 Case 189/87 Kalfelis v. Schroder Articles 5 (3)
and 6 (I )
Cases  pending as at 1 February 1989
OJ No C 308
2. 12. 1986, p. 4
OJ No C 39
17. 1987
OJ No C 8
13. l.1988
OJ No C 2
6. l. 1988, p. 3
OJ No C 63,
8. 3. 1988, p. 6
OJ No C 89
6. 4. 1988, p. 9
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11. 8. 1988, p. 7
OJ NoC 281
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133. A number of applications for preliminary rulings are currently before the Court of Jus-
tice. The cases involved are as follows:
(a) Case 32/88 Six Constructions v. Humbert
Article 5 (I)  Contract of employment
What if a contract of employment is performed in a number of countries?
OJ No C 55, 26. 2. 1988, p. 12.
(b) Case 36/88 Schilling v. Merbes
Article 27 (2)
What if the defaulting defendant was not served with the document instituting
proceedings in due form, albeit in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his
defence?
OJ No C 79, 26. 3. 1988, p. 4.
This case has been removed from the register following the withdrawal of the
appeal.
(c) Case 115/88 Reichert- Kockler v. Dresdner Bank
Article 16 (1)  Concept of rights  in rem  in immovable property
OJ No C 125 , 12. 1988, p. 13.
(d) Case 220/88 Dumez Batiment SA v. Hessische Landesbank
Article 5 (3)
OJ No C 226, 1. 9. 1988, p. 6.
(e) Case 305/88 Lancray SA v. Peters & Sickert KG
Article 27 (2)
OJ No C 300, 25. 11. 1988, p. 10.
(f) Case 365/88 Congress Agentur Hagen GmbH/Zeehaghe BY
Article 5 (beginning) and point 1 and Article 6 (beginning) and point 2
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ANNEX I
THE LAW IN FORCE IN THE EFT A MEMBER STATES CONCERNING THE
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
A. AUSTRIA
134. Foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters are not recognized and cannot be enforced in
Austria unless a treaty is in force with the State in which the judgment was given. However, for-
eign judgments concerning the status or legal capacity of persons are in most cases recognized
even if there are no statutory provisions requiring such recognition. A foreign judgment which is
neither recognized nor enforced in Austria may however have a certain evidential value there. The
evidential value of a foreign judgment will depend on the circumstances in each particular case.
B. FINLAND AND SWEDEN
135. The main principle of Finnish and of Swedish law is that foreign judgments are neither recognized
nor enforced, unless there is a statutory provision to the contrary. Such statutory provisions are
very few and they are almost always based on international conventions or agreements. Most of
these provisions cover only decisions dealing with rather special matters, such as some aspects of
international carriage, maintenance or civil liability in the field of nuclear energy.
What has been mentioned above does, however, not apply to decisions relating to status and legal
capacity. Those decisions are in most cases recognized even where there is no statutory provision
ordering recognition.
The fact that a foreign judgment is, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, neither
recognized nor enforced in Finland and Sweden does not mean that such a foreign judgment is
completely without value in those countries. Firstly a foreign judgment can be invoked as evi-
dence concerning certain facts or the contents of applicable foreign law. According to Finnish and
Swedish law there is, generally speaking, no 'inadmissible' evidence at all. Within: the framework
of this principle, the court may take into consideration the facts established in foreign proceedings
and the foreign courts' legal reasoning. Naturally this evidential value of a foreign judgment will
depend on the circumstances in each particular case, especially on the degree of confidence in the
foreign court. In some situations, particularly when according to the rules on conflict of laws the
dispute is to be decided by the substantive law of the foreign court and the foreign court has
applied the same law  (lex fori), the foreign judgment may shift the burden of proof to the party
challenging its outcome. If the judgment of a foreign court relates to immovable property within
its jurisdiction there will  at least in most cases - be no review of the substance of the dispute.
Secondly, a foreign judgment may be of great value in Finland and Sweden also in those cases
where Finnish and Swedish courts do not have jurisdiction and where a party nevertheless has an
interest to rely upon the judgment in the country concerned, e.g. in order to obtain enforcement of
a money judgment. If, for instance, a foreign court according to a forum-selection clause has
exclusive jurisdiction for a dispute, Finnish and Swedish courts will usually decline jurisdiction.
The judgment of the chosen foreign court  (forum prorogatum)  cannot, however, be enforced in
Finland or Sweden as such. The plaintiff (the creditor) can in this situation sue in a Finnish or
Swedish court invoking the foreign judgment. The court will, under such circumstances, most
probably abstain from considering the merits of the case and base its decision on the foreign judg-
ment. In any case there will be no complete review of the merits (revision au fond) of the foreign
judgment.
C. ICELAND
136. The main principle of Icelandic law is that foreign judgments are neither recognized nor enforced
unless there is a statutory provision to the contrary. Such provisions have hithertoNo. C 189/112 Official Journal of the European Communities 28.
always been based on international conventions. However, foreign judgments concerning the sta-
tus or legal capacity of a natural person are usually recognized even if there is no statutory provi-
sion ordering recognition. Foreign judgments which are neither recognized nor enforced in Ice-
land can, however, have a certain evidential value there. This is mainly due to the fact that there
, generally speaking, no inadmissible evidence in Icelandic courts. The findings of fact in a for-
eign judgment are therfore likely to have a certain relevance.
D. NORWAY
137. Foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters are not recognized and may not be enforced in
Norway unless there is a treaty with the State in which the judgment in question was rendered.
However, foreign judgments concerning the status or legal capacity of a natural person are recog-
nized in Norway even if there is no treaty with the State in question, provided that certain criteria
are fulfilled.
As regards jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments based on a convention conferring jurisdic-
tion, Norway operates a procedure similar to those applying in Finland and Sweden (see point
135 above).
The remarks in point 135 above on the evidential validity of a foreign judgment also apply to
Norway.
E. SWITZERLAND
138. In Switzerland, the rules relating to international jurisdiction and the principles governing the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments were until very recently scattered among sev-
erallegal sources, these being partly federal and partly cantonal. On a number of matters relevant
to international jurisdiction, neither federal law nor cantonal law contained explicit rules. In such
situations the principles of intercantonallaw were applied by analogy to international cases.
On 18 December 1987, the Swiss Parliament passed a new Act on Private International Law. The
new law, which will come into force on 1 January 1989, contains provisions on the international
jurisdiction of Swiss courts and on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters. These provisions replace the present provisions of cantonal and federal law
concerning jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus, the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters will in its entirety be governed by fed-
erallaw, which prevails over the cantonal laws. According to the APIL, reciprocity will no longer
be a formal requirement for obtaining recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments. In fact
the effects of the reciprocity-test are replaced by the new system of control of jurisdiction of the
State of origin.
According to Article 25 of the APIL, a foreign judgment will be recognized in Switzerland;
if the courts of the State of origin had jurisdiction according to the APIL;
if the judgment is no longer subject to ordinary forms of review or if the judgment is
final;
if there is no ground for refusal mentioned in APIL Article 27.
A foreign court is according to APIL Article 26 considered to have jurisdiction:
if this follows from a provision in the APIL (e.g. Articles 112 to 115 as regards contracts
and civil liability, and Articles 151 to 153 as regards company law) or, in the absence of
such a provision, if the defendant had his domicile in the State of origin;
in the case of dispute concerning a sum of money, if the parties have agreed that the
court which has given the judgment had jurisdiction and this agreement was not invalid
according to the provisions of the APIL
in the case of a dispute concerning a sum of money, if the defendant has argued the
merits without challenging the jurisdiction of the court or making any reservation there-
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d) in the case of a counterclaim, if the court had jurisdiction to try the principal claim and
the principal claim and the counterclaim were interrelated.
A foreign judgment will, according to Article 27, paragraph 1 of the APIL, not be recognized
if recognition would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of Switzerland.
Recognition of a judgment will, according to Article 27 paragraph 2, also be refused at the
request of a party against whom it is invoked if that party furnishes proof:
a) that he was, neither according to the law of his domicile nor according to the law of his
habitual residence, duly served with the document which instituted the proceedings
unless he has argued the merits without reservation;
b) that the judgment resulted from proceedings incompatible with fundamental principles
of the Swiss law of procedure, especially that the party concerned has not had an oppor-
tunity to defend himself;
c) that proceedings between the same parties and concerning the same matter
i) are already pending before a court in Switzerland
ii) have resulted in a decision by a Swiss court, or
iii) have resulted in an earlier judgment by a court of a third State which fulfills the
conditions for recognition in Switzerland.
Under Article 29, paragraph I, a judgment which is recognized according to Articles 25 to 27
of the APIL will be enforced in Switzerland, on the application of any interested party. The
application for enforcement must be submitted to the competent authority of the canton
where the foreign judgment is invoked. The following documents must be attached to the
application:
a) a complete and authenticated copy of the decision;
b) an attestation according to which the judgment is no longer subject to the ordinary forms
of review in the State of origin or that it is final;
c) if the judgment was rendered by default, an official document establishing that the
defaulting party was served with the document instituting the proceedings and had an
opportunity to defend himself.
In the proceedings for recognition and enforcement the party against whom enforcement is
sought must be heard (Article 29, paragraph 2).No. C 189/114 Official Journal of the European Communities 28. 7. 90
ANNEX II
EXISTING CONVENTIONS WHICH CONCERN THE EFT A MEMBER STATES
139. Apart from conventions dealing with particular matters, various conventions on recognition and
enforcement of judgments exist between certain EFT A Member States and certain States of the
European Communities. These are the conventions listed in Article 55 of the Lugano Convention
between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, the bilateral treaties concluded
between Austria and Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Federal
Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, and the bilateral treaties concluded between the
Swiss Confederation and Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Norway and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and between Norway and the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.
In addition to conventions dealing with particular matters, various conventions on recognition
and enforcement also exist between the EFT A Member States. These are the abovementioned
convention between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, the bilateral conventions
concluded by Austria with Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Swiss Confederation and the bila-
teral convention between Sweden and the Swiss Confederation listed in Article 55 of the Lugano
Convention. Thus, relations between Switzerland on the one hand, and Finland, Iceland and Nor-
way on the other hand, as well as relations between Austria and Iceland, are hampered by the
absence of such conventions.
There are also differences between the various conventions. The convention between Switzerland
and France is based on 'direct' jurisdiction; but all the others are based on 'indirect' jurisdiction.
There are also various other differences between these conventions which need not be discussed
in detail; they relate in particular to the determination of courts with jurisdiction and to the condi-
tions governing recognition and enforcement.28. 7. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 189/115
ANNEX III
FINAL ACT
The representatives of
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ICELAND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF THE ' NETHERLANDS
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF NORWAY
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SWISS CONFEDERATION
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND
Assembled at Lugano on the sixteenth day of September in the year one thousand nine
hundred and eighty-eight on the occasion of the Diplomatic Conference on jurisdiction in
civil matters, have placed on record the fact that the following texts have been drawn up and
adopted within the Conference:
the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commer-
cial matters;
II. the following Protocols, which form an integral part of the Convention:
- I , on certain questions of jurisdiction, procedure and enforcement
- 2, on the uniform interpretation of the Convention
3, on the application of Article 57;
III. the following Declarations:
Declaration by the representatives of the Governments of the States signatories to
the Lugano Convention which are members of the European Communities on Pro-
tocol 3 on the application of Article 57 of the Convention
Declaration by the representatives of the Governments of the States signatories to
the Lugano Convention which are members of the European Communities
Declaration by the representatives of the Governments of the States signatories to
the Lugano Convention which are members of the European Free Trade Associa-
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En fe de 10 cual, los abajo firmantes suscriben la presente Acta final.
Til bekrreftelse heraf har undertegnede underskrevet denne slutakt.
Zu Urkund dessen haben die Unterzeichneten ihre Unterschrift unter diese SchluBakte ge-
setzt.
LE nlcrnutpro TroV avroTtpro~ l8 unoyparoovTE~ nAllPE~oucrlOl EuEcrav TllV unoypa\jfll TOU~
K(1Tro ano TIJV napoucra TEAlKtj npa~ll.
In witness whereof, the undersigned have signed this Final Act.
En foi de quoi, les soussignes ont appose leurs signatures au bas du present acte final.
Da fhianu sin, chuir na daoine thios-sinithe a lamh leis an lonstraim Chriochnaitheach seo.
Pessu til sta6festu hafa undirrita6ir undirrita6 lokager6 pessa.
In fede di che, i sottoscritti hanno apposto Ie loro firme in ca1ce al presente atto finale.
Ten bIijke waarvan de ondergetekenden hun handtekening onder deze Slotakte hebben ge-
steld.
Til bekreftelse har de undertegnete underskrevet denne Sluttakt.
Em fe do que os abaixo-assinados apuseram as suas assinaturas no final do presente Acto
Final.
Taman vakuudeksi allekirjoittaneet ovat, allekirjoittaneet taman Paattopoytakirjan.
Till bekraftelse harav har undertecknade undertecknat denna Slutakt.
Hecho en Lugano, a dieciseis de septiembre de mil novecientos ochenta y ocho.
Udfrerdiget i Lugano, den sekstende september nitten hundrede og otteogfirs.
Geschehen zu Lugano am sechzehnten September neunzehnhundertachtundachtzig.
EYlVE ()'TO AouYKavo, crn~ atKa t~l LEnTE~~plOU XlAla EVVlaKOla lYOOVTO.
Done at Lugano on the sixteenth day of September in the year one thousand nine hundred
and eighty-eight.
Fait a Lugano, Ie seize septembre mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-huit.
Arna dheanamh i Lugano, an Sell la deag de Mhean F6mhair sa bhliain mile naoi gcead
ochto a hocht.
Gjort i Lugano hinn sextanda dag septembermana6ar nitjan hundru6 attatiu og atta.
Fatto a Lugano, addi' sedici settembre millenovecentottantotto.
Gedaan te Lugano, de zestiende september negentienhonderd achtentachtig.
Utferdiget i Lugano, den sekstende september nitten hundre og attiatte.
Feito em Lugano, em dezasseis de Setembro de mil novecentos e oitenta e oito.28. 7. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 189/117
Tehty Luganossa kuudentenatoista paivana syyskuuta vuonna tuhat yhdeksansataa kahdek-
sankymmentakahdeksan.
Som skedde i Lugano den sextonde september nittonhundraattioatta.
Pour Ie gouvernement du royaume de Belgique
Voor de Regering van het Koninkrijke Belgie
For regeringen for Kongeriget Danmark
---
Fur die Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
k-r
fla TllV K\)~tpVTJcrv T1l~ EAAllvlKtj~ ~llJlOKpana~
!:~
c.AA
Por el Gobierno del Reino de Espana
Pour Ie gouvernement de la Republique fran~aise
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Fyrir rikisstj6rn ly6veldisins Islands
c.. ~
---,-
Per il governo della Repubblica italiana
' ' ./ - ......
. F' l~"""-- 
""",,".,, '"
Pour Ie gouvernement du grand-duche de Luxembourg
'-!i
Yoor de Regering van het KoI1inkrijk der Nederlanden
rJ ,
G2~Q- 
~ --
For Kongeriket Norges Regjering 
,.  , /
Ii' 
S~~  7~~
Fur die Regierung der Republik Oesterreich
Pelo Governo da Republica Portuguesa
( \
P""'"
-.. 
t/ 
'- --- ;.----- 
Fur die Regierung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft
Pour Ie gouvernement de la Confederation suisse
Per il Governo dell a Confederazione svizzera
~t2
(. ;"
,.. . . V\ ""-"\28. Official Journal of the European Communities
Suomen tasavallan hallituksen p\,!olesta
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Wl,
For Konungariket Sveriges regering
~- ..
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
/1~~
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Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
(2) Convention of 9 October 1978 on the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (OJ No L 304, 30. 10. 1978) and Convention of 25 October
1982 on the accession of Greece (OJ No L 388, 31. 12. 1982).
(3) The Jenard and Schlosser reports were published on OJ No C 59, 15. 3. 1979. The report by Mr
Evrigenis and Mr Kerameus was published in OJ No C 298, 24. II. 1986.
In order to align the United Kingdom concept of domicile on that of many continental countries
the Civil Jurisdiction Act 1982, introducing the Convention into United Kingdom law, deals with
the matter in Section 41. According to the Act, a person is deemed to have his domicile in the
United Kingdom if he resides there and the nature and circumstances of his residence show there
to be an effective link between his residence and the United Kingdom. For Ireland, see the Juris-
diction of Courts and Enforcement of Judgments (European Communities) Act 1988, Sections 
and 5 in the Schedule,
Article 6 of the Rome Convention provides that:
'1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3, in a contract of employment a choice of law
made by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the employee of the protection afforded
to him by the mandatory rules of the law which would be applicable under paragraph 2 in the
absence of choice.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, a contract of employment shall, in the absence of
choice in accordance with Article 3, be governed:
(a) by the law of the country in which the employee habitually carries out his work in perform-
ance of the contract, even if he is temporarily employed in another country; or
(b) if the employee does not habitually carry out his work in anyone country, by the law of the
country in which the place of business through which he was engaged is situated;
unless it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected
with another country, in which case the contract shall be governed by the law of that country.'
These international agreements are numerous and relate to fields as varied as inland waterway
transport, transport by sea, air, road and rail, and maintenance obligations. See, for instance, Jen-
ard report, pp. 59 and 60.
(7) In the course of the negotiations no account was taken of the distinction between 'Contracting
State' and 'party' made in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 2 (f) and (g)). As
in the Brussels Convention, the term 'Contracting State' refers both to a State which has consented
to be bound by the Convention, either by ratifying it or by acceding to it, and to a State in respect
of which the Convention has entered into force.
Non-European dependent territories of the United Kingdom, which have expressed interest
in participating in the EEC/EFT A Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Montserrat
and Turks and Caicos Islands, Hong Kong.
Non-European dependent territories of the United Kingdom other than those mentioned
above:
Caribbean and North Atlantic: Cayman Islands
South Atlantic: British Antartic Territory, Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the
South Sandwich Islands, St Helena and dependencies (Ascension Island) (Tristan da
Cunha),
Indian Ocean: British Indian Ocean Territory,
South Pacific: Pitcairn Island, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno.
Article 59 of the Federal Constitution states that:
1. For the purposes of personal claims a solvent debtor domiciled in Switzerland must be sued
before the court for his domicile; his property may not therefore be seized or sequestrated outside
the canton in which he is domiciled, in pursuance of personal claims.
2. In the case of foreign nationals this is without prejudice to the provisions of international
treaties.'28. 7. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 189/121
Article 1482 of the Spanish Civil Code:
'The purchaser against whom an action for eviction is brought shall request, within the period
specified by the Code of Civil Procedure for replying to the action, that it be served on the ven-
dor(s) as soon as possible.
Service shall be in the manner specified in the said Code for service on defendants.
The time limit for reply by the purchaser shall be suspended until the expiry of the period notified
to the vendor(s) for appearing and replying to the action, which shall correspond to the periods
laid down for all defendants by the Code of Civil Procedure and shall run from the date of the
service referred to in paragraph I of this Article.
If the persons against whom eviction proceedings are brought fail to appear in the manner and
time specified, the period allowed for replying to the action shall be extended in respect of the
purchaser.'
(10 It should be noted that to date one draft Regulation contains such provisions.
(II Much of this section is taken from Weser-Jenard: Manuel de droit international prive Van der
Elst, Volume II: Les conflits de juri dictions, Bruylant, Brussels, 1985.No. C 189/122 Official Journal of the European Communities 28.
The Spanish and Portuguese language editions of the  Official Journal of the European Com-
munities  also contain the Spanish and Portuguese versions of the reports by Mr P. Jenard
and Professor Dr P. Schlosser (these reports are published in Danish, Dutch, English
French, German and Italian in  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 59 of 
March 1979 and in Greek "in  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 298 of 24
November 1986) and of the report by Professors D. Evrigenis and K. D. Kerameus (this
report is published in Danish, Dutch, English, French, German , Greek and Italian in  Official
Journal of the European Communities  No C 298 of 24 November 1986).